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ARTICLES
To Err is Human, To Apologize is Hard: The Role of
Apologies in Lawyer Discipline
LESLIE C. LEVIN* AND JENNIFER K. ROBBENNOLT**
ABSTRACT
The lawyer discipline system is often the only recourse for complainants
when lawyers misbehave. Yet it is also deeply unsatisfying. Most grievances are
dismissed and even when a sanction is imposed, the complainant receives no
monetary compensation. Lawyers rarely even apologize for the harm they
caused. Yet apologies can repair relationships and trust, decrease distress,
restore the victim’s standing, and affirm important values. In this article, we
explore whether and how apologies might be more systematically incorporated
into the lawyer discipline system to address lawyer mistakes and misconduct.
We detail how apologies are currently sporadically used and evaluated by dis-
ciplinary authorities. We explore the psychological, educational, and signaling
benefits of apologies and the beneficial features of apologies for complainants,
lawyers, and disciplinary authorities. We then consider the various junctures at
which apologies could productively be incorporated into the discipline process
and the psychological and legal impediments to doing so. We conclude by con-
sidering how lawyers could be better educated about the benefits of making
meaningful apologies in the context of lawyer discipline and how they might be
trained to do so.
TABLE OF CONTENTS
INTRODUCTION . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 515
I. THE CURRENT USE OF APOLOGIES IN LAWYER DISCIPLINE . . . 520
* Hugh Macgill Professor of Law, University of Connecticut School of Law. Thanks go to Margaret
Tarkington for pointing out relevant literature and to the incomparable research librarians at the University of
Connecticut Law School.© 2021, Leslie C. Levin and Jennifer K. Robbennolt.
† Alice Curtis Campbell Professor of Law and Professor of Psychology, University of Illinois College of
Law.
513
A. APOLOGIES ASMITIGATION . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 521
B. APOLOGIES AS PART OF DISPUTE RESOLUTION . . . . . . . . 524
C. APOLOGIES AS PART OF DIVERSION OR SANCTION . . . . . 526
D. APOLOGIES AS EVIDENCE OF REHABILITATIONWHEN
SEEKING READMISSION . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 527
II. WHY IS IT DIFFICULT FOR ATTORNEYS TO APOLOGIZE? . . . . . 528
III. SUCCESSFUL APOLOGIES . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 534
A. GOOD APOLOGIES ACKNOWLEDGEMISCONDUCT,
ACKNOWLEDGE HARM, AND TAKE RESPONSIBILITY . . . . 536
B. GOOD APOLOGIES INCLUDE A PROMISE NOT TO REPEAT. 538
C. GOOD APOLOGIES REPAIR HARM . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 539
D. SINCERITY AND REMORSE . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 540
IV. INCORPORATING APOLOGIES INTO THE LAWYER DISCIPLINE
PROCESS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 547
A. EARLY DISPUTE RESOLUTION . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 547
B. DIVERSION CONDITIONS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 550
C. NEGOTIATED DISCIPLINE SANCTIONS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 553
D. DISCIPLINARY HEARINGS. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 555
E. FORCED APOLOGY SANCTIONS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 557
F. REINSTATEMENT . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 560
CONCLUSION . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 562
514 THE GEORGETOWN JOURNAL OF LEGAL ETHICS [Vol. 34:513
INTRODUCTION
Lawyer discipline is often a last resort for aggrieved clients and can be a diffi-
cult and deeply unsatisfying process. Complainants can struggle to determine
where to file a complaint1 and states may provide little explanation of what the
public can expect in the discipline process.2 The vast majority of complaints are
dismissed without a hearing.3 Even if the complaint proceeds, the complainant
can only participate as a witness. Complainants’ views do not receive much
weight in the imposition of sanctions.4 They typically cannot appeal a hearing
panel’s determination or the sufficiency of a sanction.5 Even when disciplinary
authorities find lawyer misconduct, clients rarely receive return of the legal fees
they paid. Nor does the discipline system provide compensation for the harm that
that the lawyer caused. Complainants rarely even receive an apology.6
Most lawyer discipline complaints are brought against solo and very small firm
lawyers7 and allege neglect of client matters or failure to communicate.8 These
are the lawyers who represent individuals and small businesses, often in personal
plight matters (e.g., bankruptcy, criminal, family, personal injury). Their clients
often have little leverage to force their lawyers to remedy their conduct. Clients
1. For example, in order to file a complaint in New York, the client must first determine in which of four ju-
dicial departments the lawyer was admitted to practice. In all states, they must determine whether to file the
complaint with the state bar or some other entity. In some states, the information about filing a complaint and
the complaint form are only available in English. See, e.g., Attorney Discipline, KY. B. ASS’N, https://www.
kybar.org/page/attdis [https://perma.cc/H74G-4GC3] (last visited June 15, 2021); General Counsel, OKLA. B.
ASS’N, https://www.okbar.org/gc/complaint/ [https://perma.cc/XE95-QWEK] (last visited June 15, 2021). See
also Office of the Committee on Professional Conduct, ARK. JUDICIARY, https://www.arcourts.gov/
administration/professional-conduct [https://perma.cc/6VZ2-4B7S] (last visited June 15, 2021).
2. Some official websites do not explain the steps involved, what the complainant can hope to achieve, or
how long the process is likely to take. See, e.g., Frequently Asked Questions, S.C. JUD. BRANCH, https://www.
sccourts.org/discCounsel/faq.cfm [https://perma.cc/E4GV-9KN8] (last visited June 15, 2021); see also
Attorney Discipline, supra note 1.
3. See, e.g., Annual Report of 2019, ATT’Y REGISTRATION & DISCIPLINARY COMMISSION 22 (2020), https://
www.iardc.org/AnnualReport2019.pdf [https://perma.cc/V3T2-5AP3] [hereinafter ARDC Annual Report];
44th Annual Report, ATT’Y GRIEVANCE COMMISSION MD. 22 (2019), https://www.courts.state.md.us/sites/
default/files/import/attygrievance/docs/annualreport19.pdf [https://perma.cc/Z5T9-M7TC].
4. See ABA STANDARDS FOR IMPOSING LAWYER SANCTIONS, Standard 9.4(e) (1992) (noting that complai-
nant’s recommendation as to sanction is not to be considered as either a mitigating or aggravating factor in the
determination).
5. See, e.g., Discipline Process Frequently Asked Questions, CONN. JUD. BRANCH STATEWIDE GRIEVANCE
COMMISSION, https://www.jud.ct.gov/SGC/faq_discipline.htm [https://perma.cc/Y5QM-JUCE] (last visited
June 15, 2021); Annual Report, June 1, 2019–May 31, 2020, ST. B. TEX. COMMISSION FOR LAW. DISCIPLINE 19
(2020), https://www.texasbar.com/AM/Template.cfm?Section=Grievance_and_Ethics_Information1&Template=/
CM/ContentDisplay.cfm&ContentID=41986 [https://perma.cc/2DMJ-WF5U].
6. E-mail from Mark Dubois, former Chief Disciplinary Counsel of Connecticut, to Leslie C. Levin (Oct.
23, 2020, 11:31 EDT).
7. Leslie C. Levin, The Ethical World of Solo and Small Law Firm Practitioners, 41 HOUS. L. REV. 309,
312–13 (2004).
8. See, e.g., ARDC Annual Report, supra note 3, at 21, 48; Regulation of the Legal Profession in Wisconsin,
Annual Report Fiscal Year 2019–2020, at 39, https://www.wicourts.gov/courts/offices/docs/olr1920fiscal.pdf
[https://perma.cc/593V-UN7Q].
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of solo and small firm lawyers often pay relatively small sums to hire their
lawyers—although these amounts are not small for them—or retain lawyers on a
contingent fee basis. These clients may only retain a lawyer once in their life-
times, for matters such as a divorce or a bankruptcy, and so the lawyer may not
be concerned about attracting their repeat business. If the clients are not repeat
players in the legal system, they may not have the leverage or understanding of
how to get their lawyers to remedy their behavior when their lawyers’ conduct is
inadequate or improper.9
Nor can these clients easily sue their lawyers for malpractice. A lawyer’s
neglect or failure to communicate—for months or even years—may not have
caused compensable injury. Legal malpractice is notoriously difficult to prove
and even demonstrable neglect (e.g., a blown statute of limitations) will not result
in a plaintiff’s verdict unless the client can also demonstrate that the client would
have prevailed at trial.10 The complexity of legal malpractice cases precludes cli-
ents from effectively representing themselves, but many have trouble finding
counsel to represent them in malpractice cases. Clients of solo and small firm
lawyers can typically only afford to sue for malpractice on a contingent fee basis,
and legal malpractice lawyers will usually only take on high value cases.11 Some
clients cannot find a malpractice lawyer willing to represent them in a legal mal-
practice case because their previous lawyers are uninsured and there are no other
assets available to recover on a judgment.12 This is not an uncommon problem; in
some jurisdictions, close to 40% of solo lawyers in private practice are
uninsured.13
If clients want any satisfaction, they are left with the lawyer discipline system.
But this system is designed to protect the public rather than to provide remedies
for individual complainants.14 When there is minor misconduct, a lawyer may
enter into a confidential “diversion” agreement with discipline authorities, which
includes conditions—such as attending a mandatory ethics course—but is not
considered a disciplinary sanction.15 The discipline sanctions that disciplinary
authorities can impose on lawyers (e.g., private admonitions, reprimands, suspen-
sion, and disbarment), may provide no more than cold comfort to injured clients.
9. In contrast, large corporate clients can demand the partial return of fees or that their large law firms imme-
diately remedy the problem. They can credibly threaten to sue or take their business elsewhere. See David B.
Wilkins,Who Should Regulate Lawyers?, 105 HARV. L. REV. 799, 815–17, 824–26, 828–29 (1992).
10. HERBERT KRITZER & NEIL VIDMAR, WHEN LAWYERS SCREW UP: IMPROVING ACCESS TO JUSTICE FOR
LEGAL MALPRACTICE VICTIMS 54–56 (2018); RONALD E. MALLEN, 4 LEGAL MALPRACTICE § 33:29 (West ed.
2021).
11. KRITZER & VIDMAR, supra note 10, at 147–48.
12. Leslie C. Levin,When Lawyers Screw Up, 32 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 109, 114 (2019).
13. See, e.g., ARDC Annual Report, supra note 3, at 20.
14. Levin, supra note 12, at 128; see also Julie Rose O’Sullivan, Professional Discipline for Law Firms? A
Response to Professor Schneyer’s Proposal, 16 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 1, 11 (2002).
15. See, e.g., Bryan D. Burgoon, Diversion to Disbarment, The Florida Lawyer Discipline System, FLA. B.
NEWS (Dec. 1, 2013), https://www.floridabar.org/the-florida-bar-news/diversion-to-disbarment-the-florida-
lawyer-discipline-system/ [https://perma.cc/2LQA-HRHR].
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While a few jurisdictions order fee restitution for neglect of client matters, restitu-
tion is not the norm.16 Clients derive so little from the process that it is surprising
that they bother filing complaints at all.17
Incorporating lawyer apologies into lawyer discipline is a way of responding
to the needs of complainants while also furthering the goals of the discipline
system. Unprofessional or unethical attorney behavior creates a breach in the
attorney-client relationship, a relationship that should be founded on trust.18 The
lack of an apology can further damage the relationship and the injured client, add-
ing insult to injury and constituting a secondary injury. Apologies, on the other
hand, as inherently relational responses to harmdoing, may make an important
contribution to repairing the breach and can be beneficial to clients, attorneys,
and the profession.19 Importantly, apologies have been found to decrease distress
and anger in their recipients.20 They can address recipients’ nonmaterial needs for
respect and the restoration of standing.21 Both the apologizer and the recipient can
experience positive physiological effects.22 Apologies can increase understanding,
16. Levin, supra note 12, at 129. Clients who have had money stolen by their lawyers can seek to recover
from client security funds, but these are separate from state discipline proceedings. There are also typically lim-
its on the amounts that victims can recover. See ABA, 2017 – 2019 Survey of Lawyers’ Funds for Client
Protection, at 25–26 (2020), https://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/administrative/professional_
responsibility/2017-2019-cp-survey.pdf [https://perma.cc/RN3B-CB4C].
17. The discipline process is also difficult and unsatisfying for lawyers. In many cases, grievances are unjus-
tified. Clients may file grievances because they do not understand what they can reasonably expect from law-
yers or because they are unhappy with their results. Responding to a grievance is stressful and time-consuming
for lawyers. Some solo and small firm lawyers believe that as a group, they are unfairly targeted by discipline
authorities. See Levin, supra note 7, at 372–73. Lawyers can become so consumed with justifying their conduct
that they make matters worse for themselves in the process. See RICHARD L. ABEL, LAWYERS IN THE DOCK:
LEARNING FROM ATTORNEY DISCIPLINARY PROCEEDINGS 182 (2008); see also infra notes 93–98 and accompa-
nying text.
18. Jennifer Gerarda Brown & Liana G.T. Wolf, The Paradox and Promise of Restorative Attorney
Discipline, 12 NEV. L.J. 253, 253 (2012) (describing the “profound breach of trust” involved in disciplinary
matters).
19. See generally Catherine Gage O’Grady, A Behavioral Approach to Lawyer Mistake and Apology, 51
NEW ENG. L. REV. 7–8 (2016).
20. See, e.g., Mark Bennett & Deborah Earwaker, Victims’ Responses to Apologies: The Effects of Offender
Responsibility and Offense Severity, 134 J. SOC. PSYCHOL. 457, 461 (1994); Ken-ichi Ohbuchi, Masuyo
Kameda & Nariyuki Agarie, Apology as Aggression Control: Its Role in Mediating Appraisal of and Response
to Harm, 56 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 219, 219 (1989); Bernard Weiner, Sandra Graham, Orli Peter &
Mary Zmuidinas, Public Confession and Forgiveness, 59 J. PERSONALITY 281, 296 (1991).
21. See, e.g., NICHOLAS TAVUCHIS, MEA CULPA: A SOCIOLOGY OF APOLOGY AND RECONCILIATION 13
(1991); Christopher P. Reinders Folmer, Willem H. Van Boom & Pieter T. M. Desmet, Beyond Compensation?
Examining the Role of Apologies in the Restoration of Victims’ Needs in Simulated Tort Cases, 43 L. & HUM.
BEHAV. 329, 335–36 (2019).
22. See Charlotte V. O. Witvliet, Lindsey Root Luna, Everett L. Worthington Jr. & Jo-Ann Tsang, Apology
and Restitution: The Psychophysiology of Forgiveness After Accountable Relational Repair Responses, 11
FRONTIERS PSYCHOL. 1, 7–8 (2020); Charlotte vanOyen Witvliet, Thomas E. Ludwig & David J. Bauer, Please
Forgive Me: Transgressors’ Emotions and Physiology During Imagery of Seeking Forgiveness and Victim
Responses, 21 J. PSYCHOL. & CHRISTIANITY 219, 227–28 (2002); Charlotte Witvliet, Everett Worthington &
Nathaniel Wade, Victims’ Heart Rate and Facial EMG Responses to Receiving an Apology and Restitution,
PSYCHOPHYSIOLOGY 588 (2002). See generally Kathleen A. Lawler, Jarred W. Younger, Rachel L. Piferi,
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repair trust, improve relationships, decrease aggression, and reduce the need to
exact punishment.23
Apologies also provide an opportunity to articulate, acknowledge, reflect on,
and reaffirm shared values.24 This recognition and reaffirmation of values can be
meaningful to recipients. It can also contribute to a process of learning, rehabilita-
tion, and reintegration of the offending attorney.25 These processes of improve-
ment can be an important part of attorney discipline. This is especially true
because public discipline sanctions are infrequent26 and most lawyers who
receive grievances will continue in practice.
Apologies are already being used more systematically in the medical field.
Scholars and health care providers have begun to recognize the benefits of apolo-
gies as a response to patient harm that results from medical error. Litigants in
medical malpractice cases report that their desire for an apology is one factor that
motivated them to bring suit.27 And patients predict that they would want an
Rebecca L. Jobe, Kimberley A. Edmondson &Warren H. Jones, The Unique Effects of Forgiveness on Health:
An Exploration of Pathways, 28 J. BEHAV. MED. 157 (2005).
23. See, e.g., Bruce W. Darby & Barry R. Schlenker, Children’s Reactions to Apologies, 43 J. PERSONALITY
& SOC. PSYCHOL. 742, 746, 749 (1982); Bruce W. Darby & Barry R. Schlenker, Children’s Reactions to
Transgressions: Effects of the Actor’s Apology, Reputation and Remorse, 28 BRIT. J. SOC. PSYCHOL. 353, 357–
59 (1989); Martin V. Day & Michael Ross, The Value of Remorse: How Drivers’ Responses to Police Predict
Fines for Speeding, 35 L. & HUM. BEHAV. 221, 230–31 (2011); Mandeep K. Dhami, Offer and Acceptance of
Apology in Victim-Offender Mediation, 20 CRITICAL CRIMINOLOGY 45, 54 (2012); Ryan Fehr, Michele J.
Gelfand & Monisha Nag, The Road to Forgiveness: A Meta-Analytic Synthesis of Its Situational and
Dispositional Correlates, 136 PSYCHOL. BULL. 894, 904 (2010); Gregg J. Gold & Bernard Weiner, Remorse,
Confession, Group Identity, and Expectancies About Repeating a Transgression, 22 BASIC & APPLIED SOC.
PSYCHOL. 291, 294 (2000); Marti Hope Gonzales, Julie A. Haugen & Debra J. Manning, Victims as “Narrative
Critics:” Factors Influencing Rejoinders and Evaluative Responses to Offenders’ Accounts, 20 PERSONALITY
& SOC. PSYCHOL. BULL. 691, 696 (1994); Holley S. Hodgins & Elizabeth Liebeskind, Apology Versus Defense:
Antecedents and Consequences, 39 J. EXPERIMENTAL SOC. PSYCHOL. 297, 312 (2003); Peter H. Kim, Donald L.
Ferrin, Cecily D. Cooper & Kurt T. Dirks, Removing the Shadow of Suspicion: The Effects of Apology Versus
Denial for Repairing Competence- Versus Integrity-Based Trust Violations, 89 J. APPLIED PSYCHOL. 104, 109
(2004); Peter H. Kim, Kurt T. Dirks, Cecily D. Cooper & Donald L. Ferrin, When More Blame is Better than
Less: The Implications of Internal vs. External Attributions for the Repair of Trust After a Competence- vs.
Integrity-Based Trust Violation, 99 ORG. BEHAV. & HUM. DECISION PROCESSES 49, 58–59 (2006); Ohbuchi et
al., supra note 20, at 219; Paul H. Robinson, Sean E. Jackowitz & Daniel M. Bartels, Extralegal Punishment
Factors: A Study of Forgiveness, Hardship, Good Deeds, Apology, Remorse, and Other Such Discretionary
Factors in Assessing Criminal Punishment, 65 VAND. L. REV. 737, 782–83 (2012); Weiner et al., supra note
20, at 296.
24. Francesca Bartlett, The Role of Apologies in Professional Discipline, 14 LEGAL ETHICS 49, 56 (2011).
25. See generally Brown &Wolf, supra note 18, at 285.
26. See ABA, 2018 Survey on Lawyer Discipline Systems, Chart I-Part A, III-Part B (2020), https://www.
americanbar.org/groups/professional_responsibility/resources/surveyonlawyerdisciplinesystems2014/ [https://
perma.cc/4A75-N978] (reflecting that out of more than 83,000 complaints received in 2018, fewer than 2,900
resulted in public sanctions).
27. Charles Vincent, Magi Young & Angela Phillips,Why Do People Sue Doctors? A Study of Patients and
Relatives Taking Legal Action, 343 THE LANCET 1609, 1612 (1994); see also Gerald B. Hickson, Ellen Wright
Clayton, Penny B. Githens & Frank A. Sloan, Factors that Prompted Families to File Medical Malpractice
Claims Following Perinatal Injuries, 267 JAMA 1359, 1361 (1992); John Soloski, The Study and the Libel
Plaintiff: Who Sues for Libel?, 71 IOWA L. REV. 217, 220 (1985).
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apology from their medical care provider if the provider made a mistake.28 Over
the past couple of decades, hundreds of health care organizations have adopted
communication-and-resolution programs that incorporate apologies—along with
open communication, investigation of errors, and compensation for harm caused
by conduct that falls below the standard of care—at the core of how they respond
to adverse outcomes. Organizations that have effectively implemented this
approach29 have seen positive effects on their malpractice liability, improvements
in patient safety, and improved experiences for both patients and providers.30
In this article, we consider the value and challenges of incorporating apologies
into lawyer discipline. The idea itself is not new: apologies are already used to
address lawyer misconduct in Canada, England and Wales, Australia, and
28. See, e.g., Thomas H. Gallagher, Amy D. Waterman, Alison G. Ebers, Victoria J. Fraser & Wendy
Levinson, Patients’ and Physicians’ Attitudes Regarding the Disclosure of Medical Errors, 289 JAMA 1001,
1004 (2003); Kathleen M. Mazor, Steven R. Simon, Robert A. Yood, Brian C. Martinson, Margaret J. Gunter,
George W. Reed & Jerry H. Gurwitz, Health Plan Members’ Views About Disclosure of Medical Errors, 140
ANNALS INTERNAL MED. 409, 415–16 (2004); Kathleen M. Mazor, George W. Reed, Robert A. Yood, Melissa
A. Fischer, Joann Baril & Jerry H. Gurwitz, Disclosure of Medical Errors: What Factors Influence How
Patients Respond?, 21 J. GEN. INTERNAL MED. 704, 708–09 (2006); Amy B. Witman, Deric M. Park & Steven
B. Hardin, How Do Patients Want Physicians to Handle Mistakes? A Survey of Internal Medicine Patients in
an Academic Setting, 156 ARCHIVES INTERNAL MED. 2565, 2566 (1996).
29. Some programs have struggled with effective implementation. See, e.g., Thomas H. Gallagher, Richard
C. Boothman, Leilani Schweitzer & Evan M. Benjamin, Making Communication and Resolution Programmes
Mission Critical in Healthcare Organisations, BMJ QUALITY & SAFETY (May 5, 2020), https://qualitysafety.
bmj.com/content/qhc/early/2020/05/05/bmjqs-2020-010855.full.pdf [https://perma.cc/9ZF7-DL83]; Timothy
B. McDonald, Melinda Van Niel, Heather Gocke & Deanna Tarnow, Implementing Communication and
Resolution Programs: Lessons Learned From the First 200 Hospitals, 23 J. PATIENT SAFETY & RISK MGMT. 73
(2018); Michelle M. Mello, Allen Kachalia, Stephanie Roche, Melinda Van Niel, Lisa Buchsbaum, Suzanne
Dodson, Patricia Folcarelli, Evan M. Benjamin & Kenneth E. Sands, Outcomes in Two Massachusetts Hospital
Systems Give Reason for Optimism About Communication-and-Resolution Programs, 36 HEALTH AFF. 1795
(2017); Michelle M. Mello, Stephanie Roche, Yelena Greenberg, Patricia Henry Folcarelli, Melinda Biocchi
Van Niel & Allen Kachalia, Ensuring Successful Implementation of Communication-and-Resolution
Programs, BMJ QUALITY & SAFETY (Jan. 20, 2020), https://qualitysafety.bmj.com/content/qhc/early/2020/01/
20/bmjqs-2019-010296.full.pdf [https://perma.cc/8HJX-XXAB].
30. See, e.g., Allen Kachalia, Kenneth Sands, Melinda Van Niel, Suzanne Dodson, Stephanie Roche, Victor
Novack, Maayan Yitshak-Sade, Patricia Folcarelli, Evan M. Benjamin, Alan C. Woodward & Michelle M.
Mello, Effects of a Communication-and-Resolution Program on Hospitals’ Malpractice Claims and Costs, 37
HEALTH AFF. 1836, 1840–41 (2018); Bruce L. Lambert, Nichola M. Centomani, Kelly M. Smith, Lorens A.
Helmchen, Dulal K. Bhaumik, Yash J. Jalundhwala & Timothy B. McDonald, The “Seven Pillars” Response
to Patient Safety Incidents: Effects on Medical Liability Processes and Outcomes, 51 (Supp. 3) HEALTH SERV.
RES. 2491, 2499–507 (2016); Florence R. LeCraw, Daniel Montanera, Joy P. Jackson, Janice C. Keys, Dale C.
Hetzler & Thomas A. Mroz, Changes in Liability Claims, Costs, and Resolution Times Following the
Introduction of a Communication-and-Resolution Program in Tennessee, 23 J. PATIENT SAFETY & RISK
MGMT. 13, 16 (2018); Michelle M. Mello, Yelena Greenberg, Susan K. Senecal & Janet S. Cohn, Case
Outcomes in a Communication-and-Resolution Program in New York Hospitals, 51 (Supp. 3) HEALTH SERV.
RES. 2583, 2589–92 (2016); Julia C. Prentice, Sigall K. Bell, Eric J. Thomas, Eric C. Schneider, Saul N.
Weingart, Joel S. Weissman & Mark J. Schlesinger, Association of Open Communication and the Emotional and
Behavioural Impact of Medical Error on Patients and Families: State-Wide Cross-Sectional Survey, BMJ QUALITY
& SAFETY (Jan. 20, 2020), https://qualitysafety.bmj.com/content/early/2020/01/31/bmjqs-2019-010367 [https://
perma.cc/56QS-9G63].
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New Zealand.31 We explore why apologies would be a useful response to com-
plaints about lawyers, the types of apologies that would be most meaningful, and
the conditions under which they might be employed in the United States. In Part I
we provide a brief overview of the lawyer discipline process and discuss the cur-
rent episodic use of apologies in lawyer discipline. Although far from systematic,
courts sometimes consider apologies as evidence of remorse. Apologies are also
sometimes used to resolve disputes with complainants, as sanctions, or as require-
ments of reinstatement to practice. Part II explores the barriers to apologies by
lawyers in disciplinary contexts. It is difficult to admit errors, even to ourselves,
leading lawyers to justify or explain away misconduct or point fingers at others.
To apologize is to be vulnerable and uncomfortable. In Part III, we argue that de-
spite these barriers, apologies have important benefits for claimants, and some
advantages for disciplinary authorities and lawyers. We describe the key parts of
successful apologies. Part IV identifies the six junctures at which apologies might
be meaningfully and more systematically employed in the lawyer discipline con-
text. We also consider the impediments and disadvantages to apologies at certain
points and the complications posed at each juncture. We conclude by discussing
the benefits of teaching law students and lawyers about the role of apologies in
practice and how to apologize well.
I. THE CURRENT USE OF APOLOGIES IN LAWYER DISCIPLINE
To better understand how apologies are currently used and viewed in lawyer
discipline, a brief overview of the disciplinary process is needed.32 The process
starts when a potential complainant (often a client or opposing party) reviews the
disciplinary authority’s website or contacts the regulator concerning a problem
involving a lawyer. In some states, disciplinary authorities will try to resolve cer-
tain matters before a complaint is filed.33 Once a complaint is made, disciplinary
authorities will review it and may try to informally resolve it, refer it elsewhere for
dispute resolution, or dismiss it if the matter is not within their jurisdiction or does
not constitute a violation of the professional conduct rules.34 If an investigation
31. See, e.g., Legal Ombudsman Scheme Rules, r. 5.38 (Can.); Francesca Bartlett, Summary Compensation
and Apology Orders in England and Wales, Australia and New Zealand: Different Structures, Different
Responses, 24 INT’L J. LEGAL PROF. 177, 178 (2017).
32. The process can vary considerably from state-to-state and so the description that follows will not reflect
the procedures in all jurisdictions.
33. See infra notes 62–64 and accompanying text.
34. See ABA MODEL RULES FOR LAWYER DISCIPLINARY ENFORCEMENT R. 11(A)(1) (2002). Some com-
plaints do not fall within the jurisdiction of disciplinary counsel because the alleged misconduct occurred out-
side the statute of limitations or for other reasons. In some jurisdictions, disciplinary authorities will not
consider certain claims such as ineffective assistance of counsel, even though these claims may implicate duties
of diligence and competence which are governed by the rules of professional conduct. See, e.g., Important
Information and Instructions, ST. B. GA., https://www.gabar.org/forthepublic/upload/Grievance-Form_
English.pdf [https://perma.cc/2929-EJ9E] (last visited June 15, 2021).
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appears warranted, disciplinary counsel will conduct one.35 If the matter is not
dismissed but the misconduct was minor in nature, disciplinary counsel may ask
the lawyer to consent to diversion conditions in lieu of discipline.36 Disciplinary
counsel will also have the discretion to recommend probation or an admonition
upon consent.37 In other cases, disciplinary counsel may file formal charges and
the matter will proceed to a hearing. If a referee or hearing panel finds lawyer
misconduct, a sanction will be recommended to a disciplinary board or state court
for approval.38
Apologies are not a regular part of the lawyer discipline process. But they
sometimes enter the process in a variety of ways.
A. APOLOGIES ASMITIGATION
When disciplinary authorities find that lawyer wrongdoing occurred, they will
often consider the lawyer’s “remorse” when deciding the type of sanction that
should be imposed. A showing of remorse is treated as a mitigating factor when
imposing discipline39 and the absence of remorse may be considered an aggravat-
ing factor.40 Whether a lawyer is truly remorseful can be difficult to determine
and judges sometimes disagree about whether the lawyer has demonstrated true
remorse.41 Even when the lawyer demonstrates genuine remorse, it may not be
sufficient to outweigh very serious misconduct.42
Courts sometimes view apologies as evidence of remorse,43 but have not sys-
tematically considered the importance or characteristics of those apologies when
evaluating this evidence. This may explain why courts will sometimes describe a
lawyer as expressing remorse, without specifying whether the lawyer made an
apology. Even when a lawyer’s apology is noted, the court may not explain to
35. See, e.g., How to Submit a Request for Investigation, ATT’Y REGISTRATION & DISCIPLINARY
COMMISSION, https://www.iardc.org/howtorequest.html [https://perma.cc/RT8B-U5EZ] (last visited June 15,
2021).
36. See, e.g., MO. SUP. CT. R. 5.105(d) (2020). Diversion agreements are used in 33 states. See 2018 Survey
on Lawyer Discipline Systems, supra note 26, at Chart II.
37. ABAMODEL RULES FOR LAWYER DISCIPLINARY ENFORCEMENT R. 11(C) (2002).
38. See, e.g., ABA MODEL RULES FOR LAWYER DISCIPLINARY ENFORCEMENT R. 11(E), 11(F) (2002);
CONN. PRACTICE BOOK §§ 2-40(h), 2-47A (2020).
39. ABA STANDARDS FOR IMPOSING LAWYER SANCTIONS, Standard 9.32(l) (1992).
40. See, e.g., In reMoore, 792 S.E.2d 324, 326 (Ga. 2016); In re Halpin, 53 N.E.3d 405, 406 (Ind. 2015); In
re Rooney, 709 N.W.2d 263, 268 n.4 (Minn. 2006).
41. See, e.g., Attorney Grievance Comm’n v. Shuler, 117 A.3d 38, 51 (Md. 2015) (Battaglia, J., dissenting).
See generally Susan Bandes, Remorse and Judging, in REMORSE IN CRIMINAL JUSTICE: MULTIDISCIPLINARY
PERSPECTIVES (forthcoming 2021).
42. ABA ANNOTATED STANDARDS FOR IMPOSING LAWYER SANCTIONS 494 (2015) [hereinafter ANNOTATED
STANDARDS]; Lawyer Disciplinary Bd. v. Wheaton, 610 S.E.2d 8, 18 (W. Va. 2004) (noting that remorse did
not outweigh “profound impact” of lawyer’s actions).
43. Likewise, a failure to apologize may be viewed as an absence of remorse. See, e.g., In reMoore, 41 P.3d
831, 835 (Kan. 2002); Office of Disciplinary Counsel v. Flaugh, No. 112 DB 2015 (Pa. Jun. 15, 2016); see also
In re Evans, 801 F.2d 703, 707 n.1 (4th Cir. 1986) (noting that lawyer’s failure to apologize for his action is a
factor that can be considered in choosing the severity of the sanction).
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whom the apology was directed. In one typical case, the court observed that the
lawyer “testified that she is extremely sorry for what happened to her clients. She
also apologized to the Court for neglecting her obligations in these disciplinary
proceedings.”44 It is not possible to determine from this description—and it may
not have been clear to the court—whether the lawyer’s statements about being
“extremely sorry” were intended as an apology to her clients. Nor is it clear
whether the clients were even present.45
Courts sometimes give “significant weight to a lawyer’s apology,” while at
other times they decline to do so.46 They do not appear to give more weight to
apologies made in private settings than those made at public hearings.47 They
also do not seem to place greater importance on apologies made to aggrieved cli-
ents or other members of the public48 than on apologies made to disciplinary
authorities, opposing counsel, or the bar.49 Courts or hearing officers sometimes
find a failure to apologize to clients to be evidence of absence of remorse,50 but
they do not appear to systematically consider this issue. At least one court has
noted that the mere fact that a lawyer did not apologize for misconduct does not
44. People v. Hooker, 318 P.3d 77, 87 (Colo. O.P.D.J. 2013).
45. For other examples, see Attorney Grievance Comm’n v. Moore, 135 A.3d 395, 400 (Md. 2016) (noting
lawyer apologized at oral argument without indicating to whom apology was made); In re Rooney, 709 N.W.2d
at 267 (noting apology made at hearing without stating to whom apology was made).
46. ANNOTATED STANDARDS, supra note 42, at 492–93. In cases in which courts decline to find real remorse
notwithstanding an apology, it is often because the lawyer failed to take responsibility for misconduct or did
not also display other conduct reflecting remorse. See, e.g., In re Augenstein, 871 P.2d 254, 258 (Ariz. 1994);
People v. Beecher, 224 P.3d 442, 453 (Colo. O.P.D.J. 2009).
47. See, e.g., In reWyatt’s Case, 982 A.2d 396, 414 (N.H. 2009) (apology made at oral argument considered
favorably); Lawyer Disciplinary Bd. v. Wheaton, 610 S.E.2d at 18 (apology at hearing demonstrated remorse);
In re Sorenson, No. SB-01-0165-D, 2001 Ariz. LEXIS 179, at *32 (Ariz. Nov. 7, 2001) (apologies to client con-
stitute mitigating factors). But see In re Hanlon, 110 P.3d 937, 946 n.29 (Alaska 2005) (noting that a “public
apology” can be an indication of remorse).
48. For example, the court may note without further differentiation that apologies were made to clients and
other affected parties. See, e.g., In re Lang, 741 S.E.2d 152, 154 (Ga. 2013) (noting in a defalcation case that
the lawyer apologized to the client, the state bar, and the court); In re Wyatt’s Case, 982 A.2d 396, 414 (N.H.
2009) (apology made to court, client, professional conduct committee, and bar). For some other cases in which
the court noted apologies to clients or other victims who were members of the public, see People v. Braham,
409 P.3d 655, 665 (Colo. 2017) (apology to clients); In re Carucci, 132 A.3d 1161 (Del. 2016) (apology to cli-
ents); In re Levin, 709 S.E.2d 808, 809 (Ga. 2011) (apology to victim’s family); In re LeBlanc, 884 So. 2d 552,
554, 556 (La. 2004) (apology to client); Lawyer Disciplinary Bd. v. Morgan, 717 S.E.2d 898, 908 (W. Va.
2011) (apology to victims); Lawyer Disciplinary Bd. v. Sirk, 810 S.E.2d 276, 277 (W. Va. 2018) (apology to
client).
49. See, e.g., In re Dillon, 176 A.3d 716 (Del. 2017) (finding remorse where lawyer’s apologies were to
Disciplinary Board and Superior Court in case involving neglect of client matters); In re Boudreaux, 2017
Bankr. LEXIS 4541, at *49–50 (Bankr. S.D. Ga. Aug. 22, 2017) (finding remorse where there was apology to
court, law partner, and bankruptcy trustee, but not to clients).
50. See In re Silva, 29 A.3d 924, 943 (D.C. App. 2011); In re Hunt, 820 S.E.2d 716, 722 (Ga. 2018) (noting
failure to apologize to client and her sons during mitigation hearing); In re McCarthy, 938 N.E.2d 698, 699
(Ind. 2010); Cleveland Metro. Bar Ass’n v. Sleibi, 42 N.E.3d 699, 704–05 (Ohio 2014). A stated refusal to apol-
ogize to a client may also be viewed as a lack of remorse. See In re Gonzalez, 919 N.W.2d 559, 565 (Wis.
2018) (noting that hearing officer found that the lawyer’s statement that he would not apologize to client
reflected a “troubling lack of remorse”).
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alone establish that the lawyer refused to acknowledge the wrongful nature of the
misconduct.51
The timing of apologies can affect whether remorse will be considered a miti-
gating factor when determining sanctions.52 Some courts have found that apolo-
gies that are made late in the process do not constitute mitigation.53 Yet other
courts have accepted apologies to clients as evidence of sincere remorse and have
weighed them significantly in favor of mitigation even when they came as late as
a disciplinary hearing.54 Indeed, one court even treated as mitigating evidence a
“profuse public apology” that was not offered until two judges on the panel noted
the absence of remorse.55 Yet some lawyers who handle discipline defense
believe it is against their clients’ interests to apologize early—or even in the cul-
pability phase of a disciplinary hearing—because it will be taken as an admission
against them.56
Courts will sometimes parse the language of apologies to determine whether
they actually express remorse for engaging in misconduct.57 Where an apology is
also viewed as an attempt to justify the lawyer’s conduct, it tends not to be treated
as mitigating evidence.58 Likewise, when the lawyer who apologizes demon-
strates in other testimony a lack of understanding of his wrongdoing, the apology
may be given little weight.59 Even when apologies are made to affected clients,
51. SeeAttorney Grievance Comm’n v. Shuler, 117 A.3d 38, 47 n.12 (Md. 2015).
52. In re Hodge, 407 P.3d 613, 660 (Kan. 2017); In re Coe, 903 S.W.2d 916, 918 (Mo.1995); ANNOTATED
STANDARDS, supra note 42, at 492-93; see also In re Rosales, No. SA 16 MC 1326 DAE, 2017 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 229250, at *86 (W.D. Dist. Tex. July 11, 2017) (noting “belated” apology made by lawyer at hearing
does not excuse intentional misconduct over a period of time).
53. See In re Ortner, 699 N.W.2d 865, 877 (S.D. 2005) (discounting apology that came sixteen months after
lawyer became aware of his ethical violation); In re Preszler, 232 P.3d 1118, 1135 (Wash. 2010) (failure to
apologize until a year after complaint came too late to deserve consideration as mitigation). See generally In re
Augenstein, 871 P.2d 254, 258 (Ariz. 1994) (noting that lawyer’s “late apology, standing alone, is insufficient
to support a finding of remorse”); Attorney Grievance Comm’n v. Fox, 11 A.3d 762, 775 (Md. 2010) (noting
that respondent did not apologize until his trial testimony).
54. People v. Waters, 438 P.3d 753, 765 (Colo. 2019). For other examples of cases in which apologies at the
hearing were credited as evidence of remorse, see In re Kurth, 433 P.3d 679, 682, 684, 690 (Kan. 2019);
Geauga City Bar Ass’n v. Patterson, 855 N.E.2d 871, 873 (Ohio 2006); Lawyer Disciplinary Bd. v. Sirk, 810
S.E.2d 276, 277, 282 (W. Va. 2018).
55. In re Coe, 903 S.W.2d 916, 918 (Mo. 1995).
56. See, e.g., Douglas Levy, Sorry/Not Sorry, MICH. L. WEEKLY, Feb. 17, 2016; see also In re McGrath,
280 P.3d 1091, 1100 (Wash. 2012) (illustrating the use of an apology against a lawyer).
57. See, e.g., N.C. State Bar v. Badgett, 2011 N.C. App. LEXIS 1302, at *30–32 (N.C. Ct. App. June 7,
2011).
58. See, e.g., In re New River Dry Dock, 2011 Bankr. LEXIS 3602, at *28 (Bankr. S.D. Fla. Sept. 20, 2011)
(noting that the apology could be summed up as “I was wrong in my approach but. . . .”); Attorney Grievance
Comm’n v. Jacobs, 185 A.3d 132, 142 (Md. 2018) (noting that while statement to client sounded like apology,
it “does not demonstrate that Respondent takes any responsibility for the outcome. . . .”); In re Sea, 932 N.W.2d
28, 38 (Minn. 2019) (noting that lawyer apologized to court for tardiness and not for lying).
59. See, e.g., In reMurray, 47 A.3d 972 (Del. 2012) (declining to find remorse where lawyer apologized but
did not seem to understand why his actions were subject to discipline proceedings); Attorney Grievance
Comm’n v. Fox, 11 A.3d 762, 775 (Md. 2010) (rejecting apology at trial as evidence of remorse where lawyer
also testified that he still did not believe he violated any rules). In this article the male pronoun is used to refer
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they are not necessarily treated as mitigation if surrounding conduct does not
reflect remorse.60
B. APOLOGIES AS PART OF DISPUTE RESOLUTION
Apologies also occasionally occur in connection with efforts to avert or resolve
a discipline complaint. About a dozen jurisdictions have Attorney Consumer
Assistance Programs (ACAP) that will attempt to resolve low-level matters
involving issues such as failure to communicate.61 Some jurisdictions with
ACAP programs, including Florida, Massachusetts, and Texas, attempt to resolve
minor problems before a complaint is even filed.62 In some states, disciplinary
authorities invite potential complainants to contact them before filing a written
complaint63 while others require potential complainants to contact the discipli-
nary Intake Department or an ACAP program before filing a complaint.64
Disciplinary authorities in other states automatically screen the complaints they
to lawyers who are subject to grievances and discipline because those lawyers are typically male. See, e.g.,
Patricia W. Hatamyar & Kevin M. Simmons, Are Women More Ethical Lawyers? An Empirical Study, 31 FLA.
ST. U. L. REV. 785, 786–87 (2004); LESLIE C. LEVIN & SUSAN SAAB FORTNEY, REPORT TO THE WISCONSIN
OFFICE OF LAWYER REGULATION: ANALYSIS OF GRIEVANCES FILED IN CRIMINAL AND FAMILY MATTERS FROM
2013-2016, at 27 (2020).
60. See, e.g., Lawyer Disciplinary Bd. v. Kohout, 798 S.E.2d 192, 211 (W. Va. 2016) (finding apology
insufficient to show remorse where lawyer retained client funds from settlement).
61. The Mississippi Bar launched the first consumer assistance program in 1994. Stephanie Francis Ward,
Voices of Reason, A.B.A. J. (Mar. 21, 2006, 10:27 AM), https://www.abajournal.com/magazine/article/
voices_of_reason [https://perma.cc/SP22-PVAF]. One of the reasons for starting ACAP programs was because
the majority of complaints did not raise issues that the disciplinary authorities would address, leading to public
disillusionment with the lawyer discipline process. See Roy M. Sobelson, Legal Ethics, 48 MERCER L. REV.
387, 387 (1996).
62. Attorney Discipline, FLA. B., https://www.floridabar.org/public/acap/ [https://perma.cc/RF52-AA2Z]
(last visited June 15, 2021). Florida also has Local Professionalism Panels that provide a process for filing
professionalism complaints for resolution “whether or not it rises to the level of an ethical breach.” Local
Professionalism Panels by Circuit, FLA. B., https://www.floridabar.org/prof/local/ [https://perma.cc/RHN4-
AALH] (last visited June 15, 2021). For the programs in Georgia, Massachusetts, and Texas, see Client
Assistance Program of the Office of the General Counsel (CAP), ST. B. GA., https://www.gabar.org/
committeesprogramssections/programs/consumerassistanceprogram/index.cfm [https://perma.cc/LU54-L7QS]
(last visited June 15, 2021); Filing a Complaint Against an Attorney, MASS. BD. B. OVERSEERS, https://www.
massbbo.org/Complaints [https://perma.cc/NH73-Z8C7] (last visited June 15, 2021); Client-Attorney
Assistance Program (CAAP), ST. B. TEX., https://www.texasbar.com/Content/NavigationMenu/ForThePublic/
ProblemswithanAttorney/CAAP/default.htm [https://perma.cc/9MC9-CCSK] (last visited June 15, 2021).
Arizona, Louisiana, North Carolina, Oregon, South Carolina, Tennessee, and Utah also have ACAP programs.
63. See Request for Assistance Form, WASH. ST. B. ASS’N, https://www.wsba.org/docs/default-source/
licensing/discipline/2018-08-31-request-for-assistance-fillable-form(00445837).pdf?sfvrsn=dae3cf1_20 [https://
perma.cc/29F8-P2V2] (last visited June 15, 2021); Complaint Form, W. VA. OFF. DISCIPLINARY COUNS. , http://
wvodc.org/comppacket.pdf [https://perma.cc/2Z5W-KUMD] (last visited June 15, 2021).
64. Charge Against a Lawyer, ST. B. ARIZ., https://www.myazbar.org/ACAP/ChargeAgainstALawyer.cfm
[https://perma.cc/2NEK-RZSM] (last visited June 15, 2021); Frequently Asked Questions, MISS. B., https://
www.msbar.org/ethics-discipline/disciplinary-process/frequently-asked-questions/ [https://perma.cc/M7JX-
4AN5] (last visited June 15, 2021).
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receive to determine whether they are appropriate for informal resolution.65
Some disciplinary authorities attempt to resolve low-level complaints themselves
or refer such complaints to fee arbitration and other dispute resolution
processes.66
Lawyer apologies are not, however, a routine part of efforts to resolve matters
informally in most jurisdictions. ACAP programs that responded to our email
inquiries do not systematically request or encourage lawyers to apologize.67 As
one ACAP director stated, “Since ACAP does not determine whether either party
was at ‘fault,’ there is no effort to encourage either party to apologize.”68
Similarly, an ACAP attorney explained that not taking sides “just seems more
likely to lead the parties to focus on repairing the problem instead of assigning
blame.”69 A third observed that she did not see clients prioritizing getting an
apology over resolving the underlying issues, such as a failure to communicate.70
Yet another ACAP program director explained that the responsibility of the disci-
plinary authorities “is to protect the public, not to obtain [a] satisfactory resolu-
tion of a dispute between an individual client and lawyer.”71
Nevertheless, after learning from disciplinary authorities that a grievance has
been filed, some lawyers decide to apologize to the complainant, either because
they are genuinely contrite or “as a means to restore the relationship and resolve
the grievance short of discipline or diversion.”72 One regulator who used to
screen complaints noted that “in about [half of] cases, an apology is often all the
complainant wants. In that sense, they can be very effective.”73
65. See, e.g., Professional Responsibility Program FY 19 Annual Report 7, VT. PROF’L RESPONSIBILITY
BD., https://www.vermontjudiciary.org/sites/default/files/documents/2019%20PRB%20Annual%20Report.pdf
[https://perma.cc/HAA4-38YU] (last visited June 15, 2021); Regulation of the Legal Profession in Wisconsin,
Annual Report Fiscal Year 2019–2020, supra note 8, at 4.
66. See, e.g., Attorney Matters, SUP. CT. N.Y., APP. DIV., SECOND JUD. DEP’T, http://www.courts.state.ny.
us/courts/ad2/attorneymatters_ComplaintAboutaLawyer.shtml [https://perma.cc/X8HD-PSL9] (last visited
June 15, 2021) (noting that after staff attorney reviews complaint, it “may be transferred to the grievance,
mediation, or the fee dispute committee of the local bar association”).
67. The only one that appears to come close is Georgia’s Client Assistance Program, which “routinely
encourages and facilitates rectifying communication.” There are instances where the communication includes
an apology and other times where it does not. E-mail from Mercedes Ball, Dir., Client Assistance Program of
the Office of Att’y Gen., St. B. Ga., to Leslie C. Levin (Mar. 5, 2020, 14:50 EST).
68. E-mail from Lee A. Ramos, ACAP Dir., N.C. St. B., to Leslie C. Levin (Mar. 6, 2020, 13:11 EDT).
69. E-mail from Linn D. Davis, Assistant Gen. Counsel & Client Assistance Office Att’y, Or. St. B., to
Leslie C. Levin (Mar. 6, 2020, 16:46 EDT).
70. Telephone Interview with Molly Powers, Program Dir., Client-Att’y Assistance Program, St. B. Tex.
(Mar. 6, 2020).
71. E-mail from Christine Deshler, Dir., Att’y & Consumer Assistance Program, Office of B. Counsel,
Mass. Bd. of B. Exam’rs, to Leslie C. Levin (Mar. 12, 2020, 13:07 EDT).
72. See E-mail from Keith Sellen, Dir., Wis. Office of Lawyer Reg., to Leslie C. Levin (Mar. 19, 2020,
09:54 EDT).
73. E-mail fromMichael Kennedy, Vt. B. Counsel, to Leslie C. Levin (Mar. 19, 2020, 19:02 EDT).
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C. APOLOGIES AS PART OF DIVERSION OR SANCTION
As previously noted, when lawyers engage in minor misconduct, many juris-
dictions permit these lawyers to enter into diversion agreements in lieu of disci-
pline.74 Diversion is usually only available where the lawyer does not have a
recent record of disciplinary sanctions.75 Diversion conditions may include medi-
ation, counseling, monitoring, CLE, restitution, and other corrective action that
disciplinary counsel and the respondent lawyer agree is appropriate.76 In a small
number of jurisdictions, apologies are expressly identified in the rules governing
diversion as terms that can be agreed upon as part of diversion.77 Bar counsel in
one of those states explained that assistance panels “often suggest a letter of
apology, but don’t require it. Our panels are concerned that an apology letter
(1) could be viewed as too easy an out; and (2) might be used against the lawyer
in a malpractice case.”78 Other disciplinary authorities report that apologies are
rarely or never used as conditions in diversion.79 To whom the apologies are
addressed and how frequently they occur is not generally known.80
Apologies may also be a part of negotiated discipline sanctions.81 Such nego-
tiations may occur after a probable cause determination or formal charges and
74. See supra notes 15, 36 and accompanying text.
75. The ABA recommends that diversion not be available where the respondent has been publicly disci-
plined in the last three years or the misconduct is of the same nature as the misconduct for which the lawyer
was disciplined in the past five years. ABA MODEL RULES FOR LAWYER DISCIPLINARY ENFORCEMENT R. 9(B)
(2016); see also COLO. R. CIV. P. 251.13(b)(6)–(7) (2020); KAN. RULES RELATING TO DISCIPLINE OF ATT’YS R.
203(d) (2019); OKLA. RULES GOVERNING DISCIPLINARY PROCEEDINGS R. 5.1(d)(3)–(4) (2018). A few jurisdic-
tions generally will not offer diversion when discipline was previously imposed. See RULES GOVERNING THE
D.C. BAR R. XI, § 8.1(b) (2020) (noting diversion is not available where discipline was previously imposed
absent “exceptional circumstances”).
76. See, e.g., WASH. ST. CT. R. FOR ENFORCEMENT OF LAWYER CONDUCT 6.1 (2019).
77. See MD. SUP. CT. R. ATT’YS 19-716(c)(3)(A)(iii) (2019); Dolores Dorsainvil, Diversion Agreements
Provide Alternative to Attorney Discipline, WASH. LAW., Apr. 2010, at 10; Vermont Manual for Assistance
Panel Members 6, VT. JUDICIARY, https://www.vermontjudiciary.org/sites/default/files/documents/Manual
forAssistancePanels.pdf [https://perma.cc/8ARV-GVDK] (last visited June 15, 2021).
78. E-mail fromMichael Kennedy, supra note 73.
79. See, e.g., E-mail from Keith Sellen, supra note 72 (reporting use in “a few cases”); E-mail from Luke
Mette, Chief Disciplinary Counsel, Del. Office of Disciplinary Counsel, to Leslie C. Levin (Mar. 19, 2020,
8:42 EDT) (reporting they are not used); E-mail from Alan Pratzel, Chief Disciplinary Counsel, Mo. Office of
Chief Disciplinary Counsel, to Leslie C. Levin (Mar. 20, 2020, 11:26 EDT); E-mail from Tara van Brederode,
Assistant Dir., Office of Professional Regulation of the Sup. Ct. of Iowa, to Leslie C. Levin (Mar. 24, 2020,
11:27 EDT); E-mail from Seana Willing, St. B. Tex., to Leslie C. Levin (Mar. 19, 2020: 17:45 p.m. EDT).
80. Although Maryland’s Rule 19-716 (c)(iii) provides for apologies as permissive condition of diversion,
Maryland does not maintain statistics reflecting how often apologies are used in diversion agreements. E-mail
from Lydia Lawless, B. Counsel, Att’y Grievance Comm’n of Md., to Leslie C. Levin (Mar. 21, 2020, 12:32
EDT); see also E-mail from Douglas J. Ende, Chief Disciplinary Counsel, Wash. St. B. Ass’n, to Leslie C.
Levin (Apr. 8, 2020, 18:37 EDT) (reporting anecdotally that apologies were used as diversion conditions about
two times in ten years). But see 2014 State of the Attorney Disciplinary System Report 33 (2015), https://www.
njcourts.gov/attorneys/assets/oae/2014oaeannualrpt.pdf?c=zXq [https://perma.cc/PH4N-NZK8] (last visited
June 15, 2021) (noting that letters of apology were a condition of diversion on three occasions that year).
81. See, e.g., In re Hartin, 764 S.E.2d 542, 543 (Ga. 2014) (describing State Bar’s request to lawyer to apol-
ogize to client and refund a portion of fee in connection with negotiated voluntary discipline agreement);
526 THE GEORGETOWN JOURNAL OF LEGAL ETHICS [Vol. 34:513
result in an agreed-upon disposition much like a plea bargain. Less commonly,
apologies are ordered as part of a discipline sanction after a hearing and finding that
lawyer wrongdoing occurred.82 A search in LEXIS/NEXIS for cases in which the
court or disciplinary authority ordered an apology as part of discipline sanction—
other than on consent— yielded relatively few cases, with some of them involving
an apology to the court and other affected individuals, rather than to clients or other
complainants.83 Apologies are more often made a condition of a lawyer’s reinstate-
ment to practice after a lawyer has been suspended or disbarred.84
D. APOLOGIES AS EVIDENCE OF REHABILITATIONWHEN
SEEKING READMISSION
A lawyer seeking readmission to practice must show rehabilitation;85 as a
result, courts frequently look for evidence of the lawyer’s remorse.86 For this rea-
son, apologies can help lawyers achieve reinstatement.87 Hearing panels may
give “substantial weight to the fact that [a] petitioner has not expressed remorse
Anderson v. Ky. Bar Ass’n, 262 S.W.3d 636, 639–40 (Ky. 2008) (describing negotiated discipline that included
thirty-day suspension and public apology).
82. Apologies are listed as one discipline option in Tennessee. See A Primer on the Discipline of Attorneys
in Tennessee, TENN. B. ASS’N (Jan. 27, 2012), http://www.tba.org/info/a-primer-on-the-discipline-of-
attorneys-in-tennessee [https://perma.cc/SCG8-M27U]. It is unclear, however, how frequently they are
required without the lawyer’s consent.
83. See, e.g., People v. Piccone, 459 P.3d 136, 163 (Colo. 2020) (requiring apology to City Attorney); Fla.
Bar v. Michaels, 2018 Fla. LEXIS 2652, No. SC16-2018, at *1 (Fla. Sept. 27, 2018) (affirming uncontested ref-
eree report requiring lawyer who was suspended to write a letter of apology to four assistant state attorneys);
Fla. Bar v. Ratiner, 46 So. 3d 35, 41 (Fla. 2010) (requiring lawyer during probation to mail letters of apology to
deponent, court reporters, and videographer at deposition); Anderson v. Ky. Bar Ass’n, 262 S.W.3d 636, 640
(Ky. 2008) (requiring lawyer to publish letter of apology in local newspaper); Hubbard v. Ky. Bar Ass’n, 571
S.W.3d 90, 92 (Ky. 2019) (requiring apology to opposing side and the court); La. State B. Ass’n v. Estiverne,
512 So. 2d 417, 420 (La. 1987) (requiring apologies to complainants); In reWashington, No. SC97715, Terms
and Conditions of Probation (Mo. 2019), available at https://www.courts.mo.gov/file.jsp?id=140925 (requiring
letter of apology to judge as a term of probation); In reWolfbrandt, No. 72316, 2017 Nev. Unpub. LEXIS 623,
at *6 (Nev. July 25, 2017) (requiring letters of apology to two clients).
84. See, e.g., In re McCann, 669 A.2d 49, 59 (Del. 1995) (requiring letters of apology to complainants and
any other injured parties as a condition of reinstatement); In re Odo, 375 P.3d 320, 330 (Kan. 2016) (noting
hearing panel recommended that lawyer must provide clients with “sincere apology” prior to reinstatement);
Stewart v. Miss. Bar, 969 So. 2d 6, 14 (Miss. 2007) (ordering lawyer, prior to reinstatement, to write letter of
apology to former clients); In re Benavidez, 808 P.2d 612, 614 (N.M. 1991) (requiring letter of apology to cli-
ents before reinstatement); Office of Disciplinary Counsel v. Nicholson, 685 N.E.2d 1234, 1235 (Ohio 1997)
(requiring public apology to judge and prosecutor prior to reinstatement); see also In re Schuchardt, No. 3:18-
MC-39, 2019 WL 6716992, at *11 (E.D. Tenn. Dec. 10, 2019) (requiring that an apology letter to the judge be
included in any application for early reinstatement).
85. ABA STANDARDS FOR IMPOSING LAWYER SANCTIONS, Standard 2.2(2)(c) (1992).
86. See, e.g., In reWiederholt, 295 P.2d 396, 399 (Alaska 2009); In reMartinez-Fraticelli, 850 N.E.2d 155,
171 (Ill. 2006); Milligan v. Bd. of Prof’l Responsibility, 301 S.W.3d 619, 627–28 (Tenn. 2009); In re Rosellini,
739 P.2d 658, 662 (Wash. 1987).
87. See, e.g., In re Stanback, 913 A.2d 1270, 1279, 1286 (D.C. Ct. App. 2006); State ex rel. Okla. Bar Ass’n
v. Townsend, 277 P.3d 1269, 1277–78, 1281 (Okla. 2012); In reMoss, 899 N.W.2d 357, 358, 360 (Wis. 2017);
see also In re Gutman, 599 N.E.2d 604, 609–10 (Ind. 1992) (noting that an apology and an effort to make resti-
tution “can provide strong indication of a remorseful state of mind”).
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or apology” for conduct that led to disbarment.88 A failure to apologize to a law-
yer’s victims may be viewed as a “significant indicator” of a lack of remorse in
this context.89
Nevertheless, apologies considered at the time of reinstatement are not invaria-
bly accepted as evidence of remorse.90 Courts may consider whether a lawyer
waited until shortly before applying for reinstatement to make an apology.91 In
addition, they may look to whether the lawyer also attempted to make full restitu-
tion to determine whether the lawyer understands and appreciates the wrong that
was done.92
II. WHY IS IT DIFFICULT FOR ATTORNEYS TO APOLOGIZE?
Richard Abel, in his case studies of disciplined New York lawyers, describes the
case of attorney Philip Byler, a Harvard-educated lawyer who got into a fight over
legal fees with his client that probably could have been resolved with the return of
some money and an apology.93 The dispute arose after Byler took a client’s tax
refund check as his legal fees in a tax matter, and the client disputed the amount of
the fee.94 After the client filed a complaint, disciplinary authorities offered Byler a
private admonition to resolve the matter.95 Instead, he fought his way through disci-
plinary proceedings, where he could not bring himself to state that he was sorry that
he had not put the disputed funds in escrow.96 Byler ended up with a one year sus-
pension from practice97 and could not gain reinstatement for an additional year.98
To err is human. It is also human to find it difficult to apologize.99 While law-
yers may be increasingly willing to consider advising their clients about
88. Lawyer Disciplinary Bd. v. Moore, 591 S.E.2d 338, 353 (W. Va. 2003); see also In re Ganim, No.
CV030404638S, 2012 WL 5200337, at *13 n.4 (Conn. Super. Ct. Sept. 27, 2012), aff’d sub nom. State
Grievance Comm. v. Ganim, 87 A.3d 1078 (Conn. 2014).
89. In reWiederholt, 24 P.3d 1219, 1230 (Alaska 2001).
90. See, e.g., In re Pacenza, 204 P.3d 58, 63–64 (Okla. 2009) (questioning candor of the respondent’s apolo-
gies to former clients).
91. See In re Daniel, 135 A.3d 796, 798 (D.C. Ct. App. 2016); In re Asher, 987 So. 2d 954, 957, 961 (Miss.
2008); In re Thompson, 864 P.2d 823, 826 (Okla. 1993).
92. See, e.g., In re Stanback, 913 A.2d at 1280, 1283; In re Pacenza, 204 P.3d at 64.
93. For a full discussion of Philip Byler’s case, see ABEL, supra note 17, at 289–366. Before disciplinary
proceedings commenced, the client’s brother, who is a legal ethics expert, warned Byler that “you are playing
Russian Roulette with your career.” Id. at 301, 308.
94. The client initially faced a claimed IRS tax deficiency of $180,000 and due to Byler’s work, received a
$52,917 tax refund. Id. at 289, 296.
95. Id. at 314–15. The offer required him to return or escrow the disputed fee.
96. Id. at 328–29. Byler subsequently fought his case up to the New York Court of Appeals. Id. at 337.
97. Id. at 334, 337.
98. The New York Court of Appeals upheld his original suspension in October 2000. Id. at 337. Byler was
also unable to display remorse when he initially applied for reinstatement. Id. at 340–41, 343. He was not rein-
stated until October 1, 2002. Id. at 348.
99. See, e.g., Douglas N. Frenkel & Carol B. Liebman,Words That Heal, 140 ANN. INTERN. MED. 482, 482
(2004) (“Apologies have a potential for healing that is matched only by the difficulty most people have in offer-
ing them . . .”).
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apologies,100 they are less likely to consider offering an apology when they have
erred themselves.101
One salient factor that makes apology difficult in situations that could involve
litigation or discipline is concern that the apology might be taken as evidence of
error or wrongdoing.102 As we will see, robust apologies include the admission of
responsibility—acknowledging the wrongful conduct and the harm that it has
caused. Accordingly, the prospect of a malpractice lawsuit or disciplinary pro-
ceedings can mean that the instinct is to avoid apologizing for fear that the
apology will lead to negative legal consequences (legal liability, discipline, loss
of a job).103 Lawyers, in particular, may be especially attuned to these legal
risks.104
But even beyond these concerns about apologies as admissions, there are a
range of reasons why it can be psychologically difficult to apologize. As an initial
matter, it can simply be difficult to recognize or admit (even to oneself) that a
mistake has even been made. In one study of lawyers involved in discipline cases,
for example, most of the lawyers “were convinced that they had done nothing
wrong.”105 How can this be?
People who have erred or made unethical decisions can be motivated to deny
(to themselves and others) that they have acted wrongfully and to make efforts to
reconcile any bad acts with their own positive self-image.106 The disconnect
100. See generally Jonathan R. Cohen, Advising Clients to Apologize, 72 S. CAL. L. REV. 1009 (1999).
101. O’Grady, supra note 19, at 8 (“Although lawyers increasingly advise their clients to apologize to
opposing parties in a dispute, often to facilitate settlement, they generally do not consider the role of apology as
it applies to them and to their lawyering work.”).
102. See Cohen, supra note 100, at 1028–30; Jennifer K. Robbennolt, Apologies and Legal Settlement: An
Empirical Examination, 102 MICH. L. REV. 460, 465–67 (2003); Hiroshi Wagatsuma & Arthur Rosett, The
Implications of Apology: Law and Culture in Japan and the United States, 20 LAW & SOC’Y REV. 461, 483
(1986) (“A crucial inhibition to a person making an apology in an American legal proceeding is the possibility
that a sincere apology will be taken as an admission: evidence of the occurrence of the event and of the defend-
ant’s liability for it.”); see also infra note 247 and accompanying text.
103. Cohen, supra note 100, at 1010 (“If a lawyer contemplates an apology, it may well be with a skeptical
eye: Don’t risk apology, it will just create liability.”); Gallagher et al., supra note 28, at 1003 (describing physi-
cians’ concern that apologizing will lead to liability); Jennifer K. Robbennolt, Attorneys, Apologies, and
Settlement Negotiation, 13 HARV. NEGOT. L. REV. 349, 353 (2008) (“[M]any defendants avoid apologizing and
are so counseled by their attorneys and insurers.”). Loss aversion may mean that these potential losses loom
large. SeeO’Grady, supra note 19, at 29.
104. See Robbennolt, supra note 102, at 375 (finding that lawyers as representatives were more likely than
laypeople to be influenced by the admissibility of an apology received by a client).
105. ABEL, supra note 17, at 491; see also Leslie C. Levin, Misbehaving Lawyers: Cross-Country
Comparisons, 15 LEGAL ETHICS 357, 370 (2012) (noting that for lawyers in other case studies “it was very diffi-
cult [for them] to even recognize that they had misbehaved”).
106. Rachel Barkan, Shahar Ayal, Francesca Gino & Dan Ariely, The Pot Calling the Kettle Black:
Distancing Response to Ethical Dissonance, 141 J. EXPERIMENTAL PSYCHOL.: GEN. 757, 757–58 (2012); see
Shaul Shalvi, Francesca Gino, Rachel Barkan & Shahar Ayal, Self-Serving Justifications: Doing Wrong and
Feeling Moral, 24 CURR. DIR. PSYCHOL. SCI. 125, 127–28 (2015). See generally Jennifer K. Robbennolt &
Jean R. Sternlight, Behavioral Legal Ethics, 45 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 1107 (2013); O’Grady, supra note 19, at 27;
CAROL TAVRIS & ELLIOT ARONSON, MISTAKES WERE MADE (BUT NOT BY ME): WHY WE JUSTIFY FOOLISH
BELIEFS, BAD DECISIONS, AND HURTFUL ACTS (2007).
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between their poor performance or unethical behavior and their otherwise posi-
tive view of themselves results in uncomfortable feelings of cognitive disso-
nance.107 This may be particularly true for attorneys who have violated
professional rules or norms because their behavior has compromised a core as-
pect of their identity as competent and ethical legal practitioners. “Dissonance is
bothersome under any circumstance, but it is most painful to people when an im-
portant element of their self-concept is threatened—typically when they do some-
thing that is inconsistent with their view of themselves.”108
Trying to square that incompatibility can lead people to deny, recharacterize,
or attempt to explain away their behavior, even to themselves.109 Indeed, people
find it relatively easy to marshal reasons to support decisions they have made.110
In the context of discipline, lawyers may blame aspects of their situation;111 point
the finger at their clients or opponents;112 or fault the judge or the disciplinary
authorities.113 As attorneys look back on their decisions and behavior, confirma-
tion bias can lead them to selectively attend to aspects of their actions that bolster
these rationalizations and to downplay aspects that might cause them to question
their competence or ethics.114 They may distance themselves from the unethical
107. See LEON FESTINGER, A THEORY OF COGNITIVE DISSONANCE 8 (1957); see also Shahar Ayal &
Francesca Gino, Honest Rationales for Dishonest Behavior, in THE SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY OF MORALITY:
EXPLORING THE CAUSES OF GOOD AND EVIL 149, 150 (Mario Mikulincer & Phillip R. Shaver eds., 2012)
(describing ethical dissonance).
108. TAVRIS & ARONSON, supra note 106.
109. See, e.g., Albert Bandura, Moral Disengagement in the Perpetration of Inhumanities, 3 PERSONALITY
& SOC. PSYCHOL. REV. 193, 194 (1999); Lisa L. Shu, Francesca Gino & Max H. Bazerman, Dishonest Deed,
Clear Conscience: When Cheating Leads to Moral Disengagement and Motivated Forgetting, 37 PERSONALITY
& SOC. PSYCHOL. BULL. 330, 331 (2011).
110. See, e.g., Christopher K. Hsee, Elastic Justification: How Unjustifiable Factors Influence Judgments,
66 ORGANIZATIONAL BEHAV. & HUM. DECISION PROCESSES 122, 123 (1996); see Michael I. Norton, Joseph A.
Vandello & John M. Darley, Casuistry and Social Category Bias, 87 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. BULL.
817, 817 (2004); Samuel R. Sommers & Michael I. Norton, Race-Based Judgments, Race Neutral
Justifications: Experimental Examination of Peremptory Use and the Batson Challenge Procedure, 31 LAW &
HUM. BEHAV. 261, 264 (2007); see also Richard E. Nisbett & Timothy DeCamp Wilson, Telling More Than
We Can Know: Verbal Reports on Mental Processes, 84 PSYCHOL. REV. 231, 231–32 (1977); ABEL, supra note
17, at 100 (lawyers in disciplinary proceedings).
111. See ABEL, supra note 17, at 33, 65, 100 (finding that disciplined attorneys blame situational factors
such as workload, judicial backlog); Lisa G. Lerman, Lying to Clients, 138 U. PA. L. REV. 659, 713–14 (1990)
(describing attorneys who blamed their firms’ billing requirements for their unethical billing practices); see
also Edward E. Jones & Richard E. Nisbett, The Actor and the Observer: Divergent Perceptions of the Causes
of Behavior, in ATTRIBUTION: PERCEIVING THE CAUSES OF BEHAVIOR 80 (Edward E. Jones et al. eds., 1972).
112. See, e.g., ABEL, supra note 17, at 65, 101 (describing lawyers who blamed their clients). See also id. at 350–51;
Lisa G. Lerman, Blue-Chip Bilking: Regulation of Billing and Expense Fraud by Lawyers, 12 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS
205, 258–62 (1999); cf. Lisa G. Lerman, Scenes From A Law Firm, 50 RUTGERS L. REV. 2153, 2187–88 (1998).
113. Donald C. Langevoort, Getting (Too) Comfortable: In-House Lawyers, Enterprise Risk, and the
Financial Crisis, 2012 WIS. L. REV. 495; see also ABEL, supra note 17, at 32 (describing lawyers who blame
“selective prosecution”); MILTON C. REGAN, JR., EAT WHAT YOU KILL: THE FALL OF A WALL STREET
LAWYER 328 (2004) (describing lawyer skepticism of particular ethical rules).
114. See O’Grady, supra note 19, at 20–21; Robbennolt & Sternlight, supra note 106, at 129–30. See gener-
ally Raymond S. Nickerson, Confirmation Bias: A Ubiquitous Phenomenon in Many Guises, 2 REV. GEN.
PSYCHOL. 175 (1998).
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nature of their decisions by thinking about them as business decisions rather than
ethical ones or by using euphemisms.115 They may minimize the wrongfulness or
consequences of their behavior by pointing to even more egregious violations or
mistakes committed by others.116 Similarly, they may enlist alternate moral prin-
ciples or different ways of judging fairness to explain their behavior, invoking the
concept of zealous advocacy, for example, or arguing that they were protecting
client confidences, or responding in kind to the way the other side acted (evoking
a reciprocity norm).117 The analytic skills that are taught in law school and that
are a central part of legal practice may mean that lawyers, in particular, are well-
prepared to engage in these sorts of rationalizations.118
The legal ethics rules may also contribute to this self-justification. In some
cases, the formal rules are quite clear. In others, they are vague and leave consid-
erable discretion to lawyers’ judgments.119 Rules that require “reasonable”
115. Bandura, supra note 109, at 195–96; see also Blake E. Ashforth & Vikas Anand, The Normalization of
Corruption in Organizations, 25 RES. ORGANIZATIONAL BEHAV. 1, 6, 22–23 (2003); James R. Detert, Linda
Klebe Trevi~no & Vicki L. Sweitzer,Moral Disengagement in Ethical Decision Making: A Study of Antecedents
and Outcomes, 93 J. APPLIED PSYCHOL. 374, 375 (2008); Celia Moore, James R. Detert, Linda Klebe Trevi~no,
Vicki L. Baker & David M. Mayer, Why Employees Do Bad Things: Moral Disengagement and Unethical
Organizational Behavior, 65 PERSONNEL PSYCHOL. 1, 5 (2012); Shu, Gino & Bazerman, supra note 109, at
331; Ann E. Tenbrunsel & David M. Messick, Ethical Fading: The Role of Self-Deception in Unethical
Behavior, 17 SOC. JUST. RES. 223, 231–32 (2004). Within the legal profession, lapses of ethical judgment are
often described as “mistakes” or “gray areas” rather than being labeled as “misconduct.” See Robert W.
Gordon, The Ethical Worlds of Large-Firm Litigators: Preliminary Observations, 67 FORDHAM L. REV. 709,
711–12 (1998); Carla Messikomer, Ambivalence, Contradiction, and Ambiguity: The Everyday Ethics of
Defense Litigators, 67 FORDHAM L. REV. 739, 754 (1998).
116. Bandura, supra note 109, at 196–97.
117. David M. Bersoff, Why Good People Sometimes Do Bad Things: Motivated Reasoning and Unethical
Behavior, 25 PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. BULL. 28, 35 (2015); Morton Deutsch, Equity, Equality, and
Need: What Determines Which Value Will be Used as the Basis of Distributive Justice?, 31 J. SOC. ISSUES 137,
147 (1975); see also Art Hinshaw & Jess K. Alberts, Doing the Right Thing: An Empirical Study of Attorney
Negotiation Ethics, 16 HARV. NEGOT. L. REV. 95, 126 (2011); Tage Shakti Rai & Alan Page Fiske, Moral
Psychology is Relationship Regulation: Moral Motives for Unity, Hierarchy, Equality, and Proportionality,
118 PSYCHOL. REV. 57, 61–65 (2011); Eric Luis Uhlmann, David A. Pizarro, David Tannenbaum & Peter H.
Ditto, The Motivated Use of Moral Principles, 4 JUDGMENT & DEC. MAKING 479, 489 (2009); see also ABEL,
supra note 17, at 297–98 (describing how lawyer justified keeping part of unexpected client’s tax refund on
grounds it was a “fair return” for lawyer’s work).
118. O’Grady, supra note 19, at 31 n. 92 (“Lawyers, in particular, are trained to see a problem from different
perspectives; thus, it is certainly not unreasonable to think that individuals trained in the law may perceive a
lawyering error as ‘harmless’ when considered against an outcome”); Robbennolt & Sternlight, supra note 106,
at 1146 (“[L]awyers are particularly skilled at and, indeed, are trained to be experts at argumentation, to pay
close attention to exceptions, and to engage in dispassionate analysis.”). The sense that lawyerly ways of think-
ing cause people to rationalize and justify is reflected in the fact that people engaged in this sort of thinking are
sometimes described as “intuitive lawyers.” See Jonathan Haidt, The Emotional Dog and Its Rational Tail: A
Social Intuitionist Approach to Moral Judgment, 108 PSYCHOL. REV. 814, 822 (2001); Roderick M. Kramer &
David M. Messick, Ethical Cognition and the Framing of Organizational Dilemmas: Decision Makers as
Intuitive Lawyers, in CODES OF CONDUCT: BEHAVIORAL RESEARCH INTO BUSINESS ETHICS 59 (David M.
Messick & Ann E. Tenbrunsel eds., 1996); see also Kath Hall & Vivien Holmes, The Power of Rationalisation
to Influence Lawyers’ Decisions to Act Unethically, 11 LEGAL ETHICS 137 (2009).
119. See Lynn Mather & Leslie C. Levin, Why Context Matters, in LAWYERS IN PRACTICE: ETHICAL
DECISION MAKING IN CONTEXT 12 (Leslie C. Levin & Lynn Mather eds., 2012).
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diligence120 and rules that prohibit false statements of “material” fact,121 for
example, leave room for interpretation of what is “reasonable” or “material.”
This ambiguity can create the “wiggle room” that may allow rationalization and
justification to occur.122
In similar ways, memory for mistakes and unethical acts can conspire to help
people avoid recognizing them. “If mistakes were made, memory helps us
remember that they were made by someone else. If we were there, we were just
innocent bystanders.”123 Of perhaps even more concern, people’s understanding
of and memory for the relevant ethical standards tend to change in the wake of
bad behavior – another manifestation of cognitive dissonance.124
Other psychological phenomena can also play a role. People tend to be over-
confident in their abilities125 and to believe that they are objective and ethical.126
This can make it difficult to engage in appropriate and accurate self-assessment
and to recognize mistakes. For example, lawyers who are overly confident in their
competence to handle particular types of cases or a high volume of work may not
recognize when they are in over their heads. Lawyers who have too much faith in
their own objectivity may fail to see when their decisionmaking crosses an ethical
line. And lawyers who are too assured that they can fix mistakes are more likely
to compound those mistakes with additional missteps. Those who are most likely
120. MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.3 (2018) [hereinafter MODEL RULES].
121. MODEL RULES R. 3.3, 4.1.
122. Maurice E. Schweitzer & Christopher K. Hsee, Stretching the Truth: Elastic Justification and
Motivated Communication of Uncertain Information, 25 J. RISK & UNCERTAINTY 185, 190–98 (2002); Shalvi,
Gino, Barkan & Ayal, supra note 106, at 126–27; see also Jason Dana, Roberto A. Weber & Jason Xi Kuang,
Exploiting Moral Wiggle Room: Experiments Demonstrating an Illusory Preference for Fairness, 33 ECON.
THEORY 67 (2007).
123. TAVRIS & ARONSON, supra note 106, at 70. See also Patricia H. Werhane, Moral Imagination and the
Search for Ethical Decision-Making in Management, 8 Bus. Ethics Q., 1, 75 (1999) (describing “moral
amnesia”).
124. Shu et al., supra note 109, at 332, 339, 343; Lisa L. Shu & Francesca Gino, Sweeping Dishonesty
Under the Rug: How Unethical Actions Lead to Forgetting of Moral Rules, 102 J. PERSONALITY & SOC.
PSYCHOL. 1164, 1168 (2012); see also Leon Festinger & James M. Carlsmith, Cognitive Consequences of
Forced Compliance, 58 J. ABNORMAL & SOC. PSYCHOL. 203, 203–04 (1959); Shirit Kronzon & John Darley, Is
This Tactic Ethical? Biased Judgments of Ethics in Negotiation, 21 BASIC & APPLIED SOC. PSYCHOL. 49, 58
(1999); Judson Mills, Changes in Moral Attitudes Following Temptation, 26 J. PERSONALITY 517, 518 (1958).
125. Jane Goodman-Delahunty, Pär Anders Granhag, Maria Hartwig & Elizabeth F. Loftus, Insightful or
Wishful: Lawyers’ Ability to Predict Case Outcomes, 16 PSYCHOL. PUB. POL’Y & L. 133, 140–41 (2010); Don
A. Moore & Paul J. Healy, The Trouble with Overconfidence, 115 PSYCHOL. REV. 502 (2008).
126. Nadav Klein & Nicholas Epley, Maybe Holier, But Definitely Less Evil, Than You: Bounded Self-
Righteousness in Social Judgment, 110 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 660, 662 (2016); David M. Messick,
Suzanne Bloom, Janet P. Boldizar & Charles D. Samuelson, Why We Are Fairer Than Others, 21 J.
EXPERIMENTAL SOC. PSYCHOL. 480, 482, 485, 488 (1985); see generally Nicolas Epley & Eugene M. Caruso,
Egocentric Ethics, 17 SOC. JUST. RES.171 (2004); Nicholas Epley & David Dunning, Feeling “Holier Than
Thou”: Are Self-Serving Assessments Produced by Errors in Self- or Social Prediction?, 79 J. PERSONALITY &
SOC. PSYCHOL. 861 (2000); Geoffrey P. Goodwin & John M. Darley, The Psychology of Meta-Ethics:
Exploring Objectivism, 106 COGNITION 1339 (2008); Jonathon R.B. Halbesleben, M. Ronald Buckley, &
Nicole D. Sauer, The Role of Pluralistic Ignorance in Perceptions of Unethical Behavior: An Investigation of
Attorneys’ and Students’ Perceptions of Ethical Behavior, 14 ETHICS & BEHAV. 17 (2004).
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to make the kind of mistakes that stem from lack of skill or competence may also
be the least likely to recognize the mistake.127 Lawyers who tend towards perfec-
tionism128 or who place a great deal of importance on being right129 can also find
it difficult to see or admit error.130
Even when attorneys can come to grips with their mistakes and overcome their
fear of litigation or discipline, apologies may not come easily.131 People who
cause harm tend not to perceive as great a need for an apology as do those who
have suffered harm.132 It is possible that such gaps are particularly prevalent
when attorneys cause harm because attorneys tend to be highly analytical133 and
may be less likely to recognize the emotional importance of an apology to the
complainant.134 The adversarial culture of law and an inclination to deny and
127. O’Grady, supra note 19, at 19, 41. See also David Dunning, The Dunning-Kruger Effect: On Being
Ignorant of One’s Own Ignorance, in 44 ADVANCES IN EXPERIMENTAL SOC. PSYCHOL. 247 (2011).
128. See Lee Taft, A Toll on Lawyers, 80 TEX. B. J. 360, 360 (2017) (describing the toll on perfectionists who
make mistakes); Debra Cassens Weiss, Perfectionism, ‘Psychic Battering’ Among Reasons for Lawyer Depression.
A.B.A. J. (February 18, 2009), http://www.abajournal.com/news/article/perfectionism_psychic_battering_
among_reasons_for_lawyer_depression/ [https://perma.cc/7CJD-R5DF]. See generally Joachim Strober,
Natalie Schneider, Rimi Hussain & Kelly Matthews, Perfectionism and Negative Affect After Repeated
Failure: Anxiety, Depression, and Anger, 35 J. INDIVIDUAL DIFFERENCES 87 (2014).
129. O’Grady, supra note 19, at 17 (“The very job of being a good lawyer . . . is intertwined with being right
and properly exercising good judgment.”).
130. Recent research has found that harm-doers who have fixed mindsets are less likely to accept responsi-
bility than those who have growth mindsets. Karina Schumann & Carol S. Dweck,Who Accepts Responsibility
for Their Transgressions?, 40 PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. BULL. 1598, 1601 (2014).
131. See generally AARON LAZARE, ON APOLOGY 159–69 (2004). For an exploration of the barriers to apol-
ogies among physicians, see Lauris C. Kaldjian, Elizabeth W. Jones, Gary E. Rosenthal, Toni Tripp-Reimer &
Stephen L. Hillis, An Empirically Derived Taxonomy of Factors Affecting Physicians’ Willingness to Disclose
Medical Errors, 21 J. GEN. INTERNAL MED. 942, 946 (2006).
132. See, e.g., Christopher P. Reinders Folmer, Peter Mascini & Joost M. Leunissen, Rethinking Apology in
Tort Litigation: Deficiencies in Comprehensiveness Undermine Remedial Effectiveness, 15 REV. L. & ECON.
27 (2019); see also ROY F. BAUMEISTER, EVIL: INSIDE HUMAN VIOLENCE AND CRUELTY (1997) (describing the
“magnitude gap” in the perceptions of victims and offenders); Gabrielle S. Adams & M. Ena Inesi,
Impediments to Forgiveness: Victim and Transgressor Attributions of Intent and Guilt, 111 J. PERSONALITY &
SOC. PSYCHOL. 866, 867 (2016) (describing differences in how harm doers and victims perceive intent); Jill N.
Kearns & Frank D. Fincham, Victim and Perpetrator Accounts of Interpersonal Transgressions: Self-Serving
of Relationship-Serving Biases?, 31 PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. BULL. 321, 322 (2005); Joost Leunissen,
David De Cremer, Christopher P. Reinders Folmer & Marius van Dijke, The Apology Mismatch: Asymmetries
Between Victim’s Need For Apologies and Perpetrator’s Willingness to Apologize, 49 J. EXPERIMENTAL SOC.
PSYCHOL. 315, 315 (2013). This is likely to be particularly true for harm doers who have a relatively low degree
of concern for the victim or their relationship with the victim. Karina Schumann, The Psychology of Offering
an Apology: Understanding the Barriers to Apologizing and How to Overcome Them, 27 CURRENT DIRECTIONS
PSYCHOL. SCI. 74, 75 (2018).
133. See Susan Daicoff, Lawyer, Know Thyself: A Review of Empirical Research on Attorney Attributes
Bearing on Professionalism, 46 AM. U. L. REV. 1337, 1381 (1997); Chris Guthrie, The Lawyers’ Philosophical
Map and the Disputant’s Perceptual Map: Impediments to Facilitative Mediation and Lawyering, 6 HARV.
NEGOT. L. REV. 145, 156-57 (2001); Leonard L. Riskin, Mediation and Lawyers, 43 OHIO ST. L.J. 29, 45
(1982).
134. See Robbennolt, supra note 103, at 380.
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defend may also disincline attorneys to apologize for their conduct.135
Lawyers may find that the prospect of apologizing threatens their sense of
identity and self-esteem.136 Apologizing, moreover, creates vulnerability. It may
be embarrassing, awkward, or uncomfortable. And it may be associated with neg-
ative emotions such as shame and anger.137 Because apologies can empower the
recipient of the apology with control over how to respond to the apology and
rebalance the moral relationship of the parties, apologizers may experience a
comparable lack of control.138 Correspondingly, those who do not apologize may
feel more in control, have a greater sense of value integrity, and experience more
positive self-esteem.139 Yet people who are contemplating apologies tend to over-
estimate these aversive characteristics of apologizing, anticipating that apologiz-
ing will be worse than it often turns out to be.140 In addition, attorneys may worry
that an apology will not help, or simply not know how to go about apologizing
effectively.141 Research suggests that just as they overestimate the aversiveness
of apologizing, harm doers tend to underestimate the beneficial effects of
apologies.142
III. SUCCESSFUL APOLOGIES
If the barriers to apologizing can be overcome, apologies can play a construc-
tive role in attorney discipline. From a claimant’s perspective, an apology might
be successful if it makes the claimant feel respected, restores the claimant’s sense
of dignity, alleviates the hurt and anger that have resulted from the misconduct,
increases positive emotion, or restores trust. A respondent-lawyer might consider
an apology successful if it is either a more personally satisfying response to error
that contributes to emotional relief143 or an instrumental way of minimizing the
135. Jonathan R. Cohen, The Culture of Legal Denial, 84 NEB. L. REV. 247, 264–66 (2005); O’Grady, supra
note 19, at 27.
136. See Karina Schumann, An Affirmed Self and a Better Apology: The Effect of Self-Affirmation on
Transgressors’ Responses to Victims, 54 J. EXPERIMENTAL SOC. PSYCHOL. 89, 90 (2014).
137. See, e.g., TAVRIS & ARONSON, supra note 106.
138. Tyler G. Okimoto, Michael Wenzel & Kyli Hedrick, Refusing to Apologize Can Have Psychological
Benefits (and We Issue No Mea Culpa for this Research Finding), 43 EUR. J. SOC. PSYCHOL. 22, 26, 28 (2013).
139. Id.; Brent T. White, Saving Face: The Benefits of Not Saying I’m Sorry, 72 L. & CONTEMP. PROBS.
261, 266 (2009). Individuals vary in their proclivity to offer apologies. Andrew J. Howell, Raelyne L. Dopko,
Jessica B. Turowski & Karen Buro, The Disposition to Apologize, 51 PERSONALITY & INDIVIDUAL
DIFFERENCES 509 (2011).
140. Joost M. Leunissen, David De Cremer, Marius van Dijke & Christopher P. Reinders Folmer,
Forecasting Errors in the Averseness of an Apology, 27 SOC. JUST. RES. 322, 329–30, 333 (2014).
141. For discussion of these barriers to physician apologies, see Thomas H. Gallagher, Jane M. Garbutt,
Amy D. Waterman, David R. Flum, Eric B. Larson, Brian Waterman, William Dunagan, Victoria J. Fraser &
Wendy Levinson, Choosing Your Words Carefully: How Physicians Would Disclose Harmful Medical Error to
Patients, 166 ARCHIVES INTERNAL MED. 1585, 1585 (2006); Kaldjian et al., supra note 131.
142. Leunissen et al., supra note 140, at 333.
143. Natalie May & Margaret Plews-Ogan, The Role of Talking (and Keeping Silent) in Physician Coping
with Medical Error: A Qualitative Study, 88 PATIENT EDUC. & COUNS. 449, 452 (2012) (finding that for doctors
who had made mistakes, apology conversations with patients or their families were “critically important to
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potential negative consequences for the lawyer (e.g., forestalling litigation or
minimizing punishment).144 In addition, successful apologies might improve the
lawyer’s self-image145 or improve the lawyer’s standing in the eyes of the com-
munity by decoupling the lawyer’s character from the wrongful behavior;146
increase feelings of sympathy for and understanding of the lawyer; and restore
trust in the lawyer. A disciplinary authority is likely to consider an apology to be
successful if it contributes to the rehabilitation of the lawyer or fosters a commit-
ment to do better going forward,147 resolves a case efficiently, helps to restore
trust in the profession, reaffirms the norms of the profession, or bolsters the legiti-
macy of the regulatory body itself or the legal profession more broadly.
We consider the components of successful apologies with an eye to all these
potential effects. These effects, of course, can be intertwined in complicated
ways and sometimes these goals can be in tension.148 A lawyer’s instrumental
apology aimed at appeasement, for example, might undercut the role of clients
and others in bringing issues to the attention of disciplinary authorities or inap-
propriately restore trust. A client who receives an apology in a disciplinary pro-
ceeding might forego a malpractice claim, undermining the potential deterrence
effects or compensation that might result from such litigation. At the same time,
however, we have seen that legal malpractice claims are rare and difficult to win
and a meaningful apology in the disciplinary context may better serve the com-
plainant than lengthy, hard-fought, and risky litigation. A particular apology,
then, may be more or less successful depending on the perspective from which it
healing and positive coping”); Margaret Plews-Ogan, Natalie May, Justine Owens, Monika Ardelt, Jo Shapiro
& Sigall K. Bell, Wisdom in Medicine: What Helps Physicians After a Medical Error?, 91 ACAD. MED. 233,
239 (2016) (finding that facing errors may “help stem personal grief and burnout”); see also Thomas H.
Gallagher, Amy D. Waterman, Jane M. Garbutt, Julie M. Kapp, David K. Chan, W. Claiborne Dunagan,
Victoria J. Fraser & Wendy Levinson, U.S. and Canadian Physicians’ Attitudes and Experiences Regarding
Disclosing Errors to Patients, 166 ARCHIVES INTERNAL MED. 1605, 1608 (2006) (reporting that 74% of physi-
cians who disclosed error to patients felt relief).
144. See generally Cohen, supra note 100; Robbennolt, supra note 102; Lee Taft, Apology Subverted: The
Commodification of Apology, 109 YALE L.J. 1135 (2000).
145. See Julie H. Hall & Frank D. Fincham, Self-Forgiveness: The Stepchild of Forgiveness Research, 24 J.
SOC. & CLINICAL PSYCHOL. 621 (2015).
146. Goffman argues that an apology causes a “splitting of the self into a blameworthy part and a part that
stands back and sympathizes with the blame giving, and, by implication, is worthy of being brought back into
the fold.” ERVING GOFFMAN, RELATIONS IN PUBLIC: MICROSTUDIES OF THE PUBLIC ORDER 113 (1971).
147. See A.W. Wu, S. Folkman, S. J. McPhee & B. Lo, Do House Officers Learn From Their Mistakes?,
265 J. AM. MED. ASSN. 2089 (1991) (finding that doctors who accepted responsibility for a mistake were more
likely to make constructive changes in their practices); see also Plews-Ogan et al., supra note 143, at 239
(“Understanding and accounting for human error may . . . by mitigating maladaptive behaviors in the wake of
mistakes, and instead promoting learning and prevention, serve as an effective way to reduce errors both indi-
vidually and organizationally”); Margaret Plews-Ogan, Justine E. Owens & Natalie B. May, Wisdom Through
Adversity: Learning and Growing in the Wake of an Error, 91 PATIENT EDUC. & COUNS. 236 (2013).
148. See generally, Jennifer K. Robbennolt, John M. Darley & Robert J. MacCoun, Symbolism and
Incommensurability in Civil Sanctioning: Legal Decision-Makers as Goal Managers, 68 BROOK. L. REV. 1121
(2003) (discussing the need for legal decision makers to manage multiple, sometimes consistent, sometimes
inconsistent, goals).
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is viewed. But, at their best, apologies have the potential to simultaneously satisfy
the concerns of complainants, lawyer-respondents, and disciplinary authorities.
As we will see, not all apologies are created equally or likely to be equally
effective in accomplishing this range of objectives. The best apologies acknowl-
edge and take responsibility for the misconduct and its consequences, commit to
improved behavior going forward, offer to repair the harm, and convey sincere
remorse.149
A. GOOD APOLOGIES ACKNOWLEDGEMISCONDUCT, ACKNOWLEDGE
HARM, AND TAKE RESPONSIBILITY
The defining feature of true apologies is that they acknowledge the error and
its consequences and take responsibility for both. It is this acknowledgment and
responsibility-taking that distinguishes an apology from other forms of account-
ing, such as denial, excuse, or justification.150 When we apologize, “we not only
apologize to someone but also for something.”151 Those who have been harmed
by another person frequently desire such acknowledgment.152 And apologies that
take responsibility tend to be the most satisfying to recipients.153 When courts
149. Apologies that address these essentials more comprehensively tend to be more effective. Dhami, supra
note 23, at 54; Roy J. Lewicki, Beth Polin, & Robert B. Lount, Jr., An Exploration of the Structure of Effective
Apologies, 9 NEGOT. & CONFLICT MGMT. RES. 177, 184 (2016); Steven J. Scher & John M. Darley, How
Effective Are the Things People Say to Apologize? Effects of the Realization of the Apology Speech Act, 26 J.
PSYCHOLINGUISTIC RES. 127 (1997); Folmer et al., supra note 132. Comprehensive apologies tend to be particu-
larly important to victims when the harm is more severe and when the offender is seen as more responsible for
the harm. Id.
150. See GOFFMAN, supra note 146; LAZARE, supra note 131, at 75 (identifying the importance of acknowl-
edging the responsible party, the offending behavior “in adequate detail,” the impact of the behavior, and that
the behavior violated social norms); NICK SMITH, I WAS WRONG: THE MEANINGS OF APOLOGIES 28–54 (2008)
(describing the importance of the acceptance of blame); TAVUCHIS, supra note 21, at 17; Barry R. Schlenker &
Michael F. Weigold, Interpersonal Processes Involving Impression Regulation and Management, 43 ANN.
REV. PSYCHOL. 133 (1992); Marvin B. Scott & Stanford M. Lyman, Accounts, 33 AM. SOC. REV. 46 (1968).
151. TAVUCHIS, supra note 21, at 13; see also SMITH, supra note 150, at 28–33 (describing the importance
of a corroborated factual record).
152. See, e.g., Nathalie Des Rosiers, Bruce Feldthusen & Oleana A. R. Hankivsky, Legal Compensation for
Sexual Violence: Therapeutic Consequences and Consequences for the Judicial System, 4 PSYCHOL. PUB.
POL’Y & L. 433, 442 (1998); Gallagher et al., supra note 28, at 1004; Gillian K. Hadfield, Framing the Choice
Between Cash and the Courthouse: Experiences with the 9/11 Victim Compensation Fund, 42 L. & SOC’Y REV.
645, 661 (2008); Hickson et al., supra note 27, at 1361; Jennifer Moore & Michelle R. Mello, Improving
Reconciliation Following Medical Injury: A Qualitative Study of Patient Responses to Patient Safety Incidents
in New Zealand, 26 BMJ QUAL. & SAFETY 788 (2017); Tamara Relis, “It’s Not About the Money: A Theory of
Misconception of Plaintiffs’ Litigation Aims, 68 U. PITT L. REV. 701 (2006); Vincent et al., supra note 27, at
1612.
153. See, e.g., Lewicki et al., supra note 149, at 185; Thomas C. O’Brien, Tracey L. Meares & Tom R.
Tyler, Reconciling Police and Communities With Apologies, Acknowledgments, or Both: A Controlled
Experiment, 687 ANNALS AM. ACAD. POL. & SOC. SCI. 202, 209–10 (2020); Kristin M. Pace, Tomasz A.
Fediuk & Isabel C. Botero, The Acceptance of Responsibility and Expressions of Regret in Organizational
Apologies After a Transgression, 15 CORP. COMM. 410, 420 (2010); Robbennolt, supra note 102, at 486–89,
495–97; Jennifer K. Robbennolt, Apologies and Settlement Levers, 3 J. EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD. 333, 359–64
(2006); Scher & Darley, supra note 149; Manfred Schmitt, Mario Gollwitzer, Nikolai Förster & Leo Montada,
Effects of Objective and Subjective Account Components on Forgiving, 144 J. SOC. PSYCHOL. 465, 478–79
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refuse to credit lawyer apologies that justify their misconduct or because the law-
yers otherwise demonstrate a lack of understanding of the wrongdoing,154 they
are often reacting to the failure of the apologies to include this basic element.
Simply offering sympathy to a victim can be helpful, though such sympathy
apologies tend not to be as effective or meaningful as responsibility-accepting
apologies.155 And, in some circumstances, the lack of acknowledgement and
responsibility-taking makes the apology less satisfying and can potentially do
more harm than good. Consider conditional or vague apologies: “I apologize if I
did anything . . .” or “I apologize for what happened . . .” or “I’m sorry it offended
you.” Or apologies that shift blame or cast doubt on or minimize the consequen-
ces of the misconduct: “I’m sorry if anyone misinterpreted . . .” or “I’m sorry if
anyone was offended . . .”156 These apologies fail to adequately acknowledge the
behavior or the harm and shift the blame rather than take responsibility.
Acknowledgment and responsibility-taking are related to another interest held
by many people who are harmed by others—the desire for information about
what happened.157 People who are provided by the wrongdoer with timely infor-
mation about what happened tend to be more satisfied and less likely to pursue
(2004); see also Joshua M. Bentley, What Counts as an Apology? Exploring Stakeholder Perceptions in a
Hypothetical Organizational Crisis, 32 MGMT. COMM. Q. 202, 216–17 (2018); Mitchell Simon, Nick Smith, &
Nicole Negowetti, Apologies and Fitness to Practice Law: A Practical Framework for Evaluating Remorse in
the Bar Admission Process, 2012 PROF. L. 37, 72 (arguing that a good apology will include accepting the “legal
sanctions for her wrongs, though she may protest these penalties to the extent that she finds them unjustifiable
as disproportionate to her offense”).
154. See supra notes 58–59 and accompanying text; In re Kamb, 177 Wash.2d 851, 305 P.3d 1091 (Wash.
2013) (the court found that the lawyer’s “‘reasoning away the misconduct does not constitute acknowledge-
ment of misconduct”); In re Krombach, 286 Wis.2d 589, 707 N.W.2d 146 (Wis. 2005) (“The referee found that
the lawyer ‘still has not demonstrated an understanding that what he did was steal from his clients’ and at the
end of the day, the lawyer thought he owed his clients nothing. According to the referee, ‘[t]his does not demon-
strate an acceptance of responsibility.’”); see also Bruce Green & Jane Campbell Moriarty, Rehabilitating
Lawyers: Perceptions of Deviance and its Cures in the Lawyer Reinstatement Process, 40 FORDHAM URB. L.J.
139, 154 (2012) (noting that “[t]here may be room for disagreement about whether the lawyer’s acknowledg-
ment is sufficiently full, or whether the lawyer has understated the extent of his or her misconduct, its serious-
ness, or its consequences”).
155. See Robbennolt, supra note 102, at 486–87; Robbennolt, supra note 153, at 359–64.
156. See EDWIN L. BATTISTELLA, SORRY ABOUT THAT: THE LANGUAGE OF PUBLIC APOLOGY 37–38, 95
(2014); Joshua M. Bentley, Shifting Identification: A Theory of Apologies and Pseudo-Apologies, 41 PUB. REL.
REV. 22, 24 (2015); Zohar Kampf, Public (Non-) Apologies: The Discourse of Minimizing Responsibility, 41 J.
PRAGMATICS 2257, 2258 (2009); LAZARE, supra note 131, at 92–93; Yiwei Wang & Matthew S. McGlone, Did
I Offend You or Did It? Agency Assignment in Interpersonal Apology, 57 DISCOURSE PROCESSES 66, 67–68
(2020). For examples of these sorts of apologies in the #MeToo context, see Charlotte S. Alexander, Sorry (Not
Sorry): Decoding #MeToo Defenses, 99 TEX. L. REV. 341 (2020); Lesley Wexler, Jennifer K. Robbennolt &
Colleen Murphy, #MeToo, Time’s Up, and Theories of Justice, 2019 ILL. L. REV. 45, 74, 82.
157. Hadfield, supra note 152 (describing 9/11 victims’ desire for information); Hickson et al., supra note
27, at 1361 (describing a desire for information in the tort context); Vincent et al., supra note 27, at 1611
(same); see also Rachel Abrams & Danielle Ivory, G.M. Secrecy on Crashes Adds to Families’ Pain, N.Y.
TIMES (Apr. 3, 2014), http://www.nytimes.com/2014/04/03/business/barriers-wall-off-the-facts-of-gm-car-
crashes.html [https://perma.cc/8AH9-K4B6]; Juliet Macur, As Gymnasts Who Were Abused Seek Answers,
They Are Offered Only Money, N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 3, 2020), https://www.nytimes.com/2020/03/03/sports/
olympics/biles-gymnastics-settlement-nassar.html [https://perma.cc/85KJ-3B65].
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litigation.158 Providing information about what happened can “convey respect for
the victim and affirm his or her status. The very fact that the perpetrator thinks
that the victim is due an explanation signals respect for the victim and tends to di-
minish the victim’s anger.”159 Acknowledgment and explanation can affirm
“Yes, this is what happened. I agree with the wronged party (and others) as to the
facts of the case and how they are being interpreted”160 and can make clear that
what happened was not victim’s fault.161
Finally, it is worth noting that effective acknowledgement may take time to de-
velop. To fully acknowledge the wrongful behavior and its consequences, the
harm-doer may need to make an effort to understand the victim’s perspective to
appreciate the nature and scope of the harm done so that he can communicate that
understanding. Apologies tend to be more successful when the victim feels heard
and the offender has been able to express an understanding of the wrongful
behavior and how that behavior has affected the victim.162
B. GOOD APOLOGIES INCLUDE A PROMISE NOT TO REPEAT
Most definitions of good apologies include a commitment to improve behavior
in the future.163 And research has found that people find apologies to be more sat-
isfactory when they include promises to refrain from committing future
158. See, e.g., Dwight Golann, Dropped Medical Malpractice Claims: Their Surprising Frequency,
Apparent Causes, and Potential Remedies, 30 HEALTH AFFS. 1343, 1345–46 (2011); E. Allan Lind, Jerald
Greenberg, Kimberly S. Scott & Thomas D. Welchans, The Winding Road From Employee to Complainant:
Situational and Psychological Determinants of Wrongful-Termination Claims, 45 ADMIN. SCI. Q. 557, 576
(2000); Frank A. Sloan & Chee Ruey Hsieh, Injury, Liability, and the Decision To File a Medical Malpractice
Claim, 29 L. & Soc’y Rev. 413, 427 (1995).
159. Dale T. Miller, Disrespect and the Experience of Injustice, 52 ANN. REV. PSYCHOL. 527, 537 (2001).
160. TAVUCHIS, supra note 21, at 57. See also SMITH, supra note 150, at 28–33 (describing the importance
of a corroborated factual record); All Things Considered, Former Mayor Calls On Philadelphia To Apologize
For MOVE Bombing, NPR (May 17, 2020), https://www.npr.org/2020/05/17/857636427/former-mayor-calls-
on-philadelphia-to-apologize-for-move-bombing?utm_medium=RSS&utm_campaign=national [https://perma.
cc/KM8G-RE27] (describing role of apology in providing clarity about what happened). See generallyWilliam
L. Benoit, Crisis and Image Repair at United Airlines: Fly the Unfriendly Skies, 1 J. INT’L CRISIS & RISK COMM.
RES. 11, 22 (2018) (“[I]t is not enough to apologize for something—one must apologize for the perceived
offense.”).
161. LAZARE, supra note 131, at 78 (“[B]y acknowledging the offense, the offender says, in effect, ‘it was
not your fault.’”).
162. Cynthia McPherson Frantz & Courtney Bennigson, Better Late Than Early: The Influence of Timing
on Apology Effectiveness, 41 J. EXPERIMENTAL SOC. PSYCHOL. 201, 204–05 (2005); see also Amy S. Ebesu
Hubbard, Blake Hendrickson, Keri Szejda Fehrenbach & Jennifer Sur, Effects of Timing and Sincerity of an
Apology on Satisfaction and Changes in Negative Feelings During Conflict, 77 W. J. COMM. 305, 315 (2013);
Aili Peyton & Ryan Goei, The Effectiveness of Explicit Demand and Emotional Expression Apology Cues in
Predicting Victim Readiness to Accept an Apology, 64 COMM. STUD. 411, 425 (2013); Michael Wenzel, Ellie
Lawrence-Wood, Tyler G. Okimoto & Matthew J. Hornsey, A Long Time Coming: Delays in Collective
Apologies and Their Effects on Sincerity and Forgiveness, 39 POL. PSYCHOL. 649, 661–62 (2018); see generally
Bartlett, supra note 24, at 56 (noting that apologies are “about acknowledging the wrong committed and the im-
portance of such a breach for a community”).
163. See e.g., GOFFMAN, supra note 146, at 113; SMITH, supra note 150, at 80–91.
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offenses.164 Such apologies recognize and reaffirm both the shared norms of
behavior and imply a commitment to uphold them.165 Whether or not the behav-
ior truly will not recur,166 people tend to infer from apologies that the behavior
was an aberration or that the perpetrator has learned a lesson and will not repeat
the behavior.167 Because victims of harm are often motivated by the hope that the
same thing will not happen to them again or to someone else, these commitments
to non-repetition are important to them.168
C. GOOD APOLOGIES REPAIR HARM
Good apologies include attempts to repair the harm caused by the miscon-
duct.169 Apologies are more effective when they include offers of repair,170 and
164. Moore & Mello, supra note 152; Scher & Darley, supra note 149. Recipients may also infer such a
promise from an apology, whether it is explicitly made or not.
165. TAVUCHIS, supra note 21, at 13; Michael Wenzel, Tyler G. Okimoto, Norman T. Feather & Michael J.
Platow, Retributive and Restorative Justice, 32 LAW &HUM. BEHAV. 375 (2008).
166. Predicting future behavior is quite difficult. See generally Brandon Garrett & John Monahan,
Assessing Risk: The Use of Risk Assessment in Sentencing, 103 JUDICATURE 42 (2019); John Monahan &
Jennifer Skeem, Risk Assessment in Criminal Sentencing, 12 ANN. REV. CLINICAL PSYCHOL. 489 (2016);
Christopher Slobogin, Principles of Risk Assessment: Sentencing and Policing, 15 OHIO ST. J CRIM. L. 583
(2018). Moreover, the likelihood of future offending may depend, in part, on the nuances of the offender’s emo-
tional reactions. Guilt is associated with decreased recidivism, while shame, when it motivates the offender to
externalize blame, is associated with increased recidivism. Daniela Hosser, Michael Windzio & Werner Greve
Guilt and Shame as Predictors of Recidivism: A Longitudinal Study with Young Prisoners, 35 CRIM. JUST. &
BEHAV. 138, 146 (2008); June P. Tangney, Jeffrey Stuewig & Andres G. Martinez, Two Faces of Shame: The
Roles of Shame and Guilt in Predicting Recidivism, 25 PSYCHOL. SCI. 799, 801–02 (2014). On the complex
associations between remorse and recidivism, see Bandes, supra note 41; Jeffrie G. Murphy, Remorse,
Apology, and Mercy, 4 OHIO ST. J. CRIM. L. 423, 439 (2007) (“The wrongdoer can be self-deceptive or just hon-
estly mistaken about the sincerity of his own repentance, and even the sincerely repentant wrongdoer can suffer
from weak will.”).
167. Gold & Weiner, supra note 23, at 292; Randolph B. Pipes & Marci Alessi, Remorse and a Previously
Punished Offense in Assignment of Punishment and Estimated Likelihood of a Repeated Offense, 85 PSYCHOL.
REP. 246, 248 (1999); Dawn T. Robinson, Lynn Smith-Lovin & Olga Tsoudis, Heinous Crime or Unfortunate
Accident? The Effects of Remorse on Responses to Mock Criminal Confessions, 73 SOC. FORCES 175, 185
(1994).
168. See, e.g., Gallagher et al., supra note 29, at 1004; Hickson et al., supra note 27, at 1361; Mazor et al.,
supra note 28, at 415; Kathleen M. Mazor, Sarah M. Greene, Douglas Roblin, Celeste A. Lemay, Cassandra L.
Firneno, Josephine Calvi, Carolyn D. Prouty, Kathryn Horner & Thomas Gallagher, More Than Words:
Patients’ Views on Apology and Disclosure When Things Go Wrong in Cancer Care, 90 PATIENT EDUC. &
COUNS. 341, 345 (2013); Relis, supra note 152, at 72; Vincent et al., supra note 27, at 1611.
169. See e.g., GOFFMAN, supra note 146, at 113; SMITH, supra note 150, at 80–91; Bentley, supra note 153,
at 217–18; see also Simon et al., supra note 153, at 72 (arguing that apologies ought to offer a “proportional
amount of redress,” though they “need not meet excessive demands from victims with unreasonable or inappro-
priate expectations”).
170. See e.g., William P. Bottom, Kevin Gibson, Steven E. Daniels & J. Keith Murnighan,When Talk Is Not
Cheap: Substantive Penance and Expressions of Intent in Rebuilding Cooperation, 13 ORG. SCI. 497, 507
(2002); Tessa Haesevoets, Chris Reinders Folmer, David De Cremer & Alain Van Hiel, Money Isn’t All That
Matters: The Use of Financial Compensation and Apologies to Preserve Relationships in the Aftermath of
Distributive Harm, 35 J. ECON. PSYCHOL. 95 (2013); Whitney K. Jeter & Laura A. Brannon, “I’ll Make It Up to
You:” Examining the Effect of Apologies on Forgiveness, 13 J. POSITIVE PSYCHOL. 597, 601 (2017); Lewicki et
al., supra note 149, at 185; Moore & Mello, supra note 152; Scher & Darley, supra note 149 at 128; Schmitt et
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victims who are compensated for their harm are more likely to feel that the of-
fender has sufficiently apologized, expressed remorse, and taken responsibility.171
In explaining why repair is central to apologies, Archbishop Desmond Tutu gives
the following example: “If you take my pen and say you are sorry, but don’t give
me the pen back, nothing has happened.”172
Material repair is important,173 but other forms of repair are also possible.
Apologies themselves may repair some of the non-material harm caused by the
misconduct. Or an attorney might perform free legal work or offer some other
sort of support to the client. Sometimes compensating for the harm is not feasible
because the offending lawyer lacks malpractice insurance or other financial
means to compensate a victim. While compensation or other ways of rectifying
harm is important and ought to be encouraged, apologies are still desired and use-
ful even when compensation is not forthcoming. In fact, there is some evidence
that when full compensation is not available, there is perhaps even more room for
apologies to be restorative.174
D. SINCERITY AND REMORSE
At their best, apologies communicate the genuine remorse that an offender
feels for having engaged in wrongful behavior and caused harm.175 When asked
to craft the apologies that they would like to receive, people frequently include
words like “truly,” “sincerely,” or “deeply” to describe the contrition that they
hope for.176 Sincere remorse is seen as a signal to recipients of apologies that the
harm-doer acknowledges and understands the wrong and its consequences and
commits to non-repetition. Apologies that are perceived to be sincere, therefore,
tend to more effective than those that are not.177 As one leading scholar of
al., supra note 153, at 478–79; Jeanne S. Zechmeister, Sofia Garcia, Catherine Romero & Shona N. Vas, Don’t
Apologize Unless You Mean It: A Laboratory Investigation of Forgiveness and Retaliation, 23 J. SOC. &
CLINICAL PSYCHOL. 532, 548 (2004).
171. See, e.g., Folmer et al., supra note 21, at 335; Schmitt et al., supra note 153, at 477.
172. NANCY BERLINGER, AFTER HARM: MEDICAL ERROR AND THE ETHICS OF FORGIVENESS 61–62 (2005).
173. Folmer et al., supra note 21, at 332. See generally Deborah R. Hensler, Money Talks: Searching for
Justice Through Compensation for Personal Injury and Death, 53 DEPAUL L. REV. 417 (2003)
174. Folmer et al., supra note 21, at 335–36.
175. LAZARE, supra note 131, at 107–08 (describing the “deep, painful regret that is part of the guilt people
experience when they have done something wrong” and noting that remorse can serve as a “sign of [the
apology’s] authenticity”); Murphy, supra note 166, at 433 (distinguishing remorse and apology and noting that
“we are interested in apologies only to the degree that we believe that they are sincere external signs of repent-
ance and remorse and reliable external signs of future atonement”); SMITH, supra note 150, at 68 (describing
“categorical regret” as “she regrets what she has done because it is wrong, she wishes she had done otherwise,
and in accordance with this realization she omits to not making the same mistake again”).
176. Bentley, supra note 153, at 218. Judges, too, may distinguish “between apology and remorse, generally
refusing to recognize the former as a legitimate reason to mitigate, at least not without some other indication
that it signals the latter.” Robinson et al., supra note 23, at 746.
177. Alfred Allan, Dianne McKillop, Julian Dooley, Maria M. Allan & David Preece, Apologies Following
an Adverse Medical Event: The Importance of Focusing on the Consumer’s Needs, 98 PATIENT EDUC. &
COUNS. 1058, 1060–61 (2015); Theodore Eisenberg, Stephen P. Garvey &Martin T. Wells, But Was He Sorry?
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apologies has noted, “[a]pology should be rooted in responsibility and remorse
rather than in economics and strategy. It is the ethical response to injuring
another, irrespective of the economic consequences.”178 In contrast, “[w]hen vic-
tims perceive apologies to be insincere and designed simply to “cool them out,”
they often react with more rather than less indignation.”179 Sentencing judges,
too, report that sincerity and “genuine remorse” are important to them.180 And we
have seen that courts are disinclined to treat apologies as mitigation when judges
do not perceive that they reflect sincere remorse.181
Assessing sincerity, however, is complicated for a variety of reasons, including
the incentives that offenders might have to feign sincere apologies.182 Criminal
offenders might find incentives for insincere apologies in sentencing guidelines
that value remorse, the desire to obtain parole or probation, or restrictions on
entry into restorative justice programs. Tort offenders might apologize to forestall
lawsuits or minimize payouts.183 In disciplinary cases, attorneys may hope to pla-
cate complainants or appease regulators.184
Signals of sincerity might be found in the content of the apology. The more ro-
bust the apology—acknowledging wrongdoing and harm, committing to do better
going forward, and expressing a desire to make amends—the more the indicia of
sincerity.185 Similarly, costly apologies, those that go beyond “cheap talk” and
have consequences for the offender, tend to be seen as more sincere.186
The Role of Remorse in Capital Sentencing, 83 CORNELL L. REV. 1599, 1633 (1998); Robinson et al., supra
note 23, at 816–17; Edward C. Tomlinson, Brian R. Dineen & Roy J. Lewicki, The Road to Reconciliation:
Antecedents of Victim Willingness to Reconcile Following a Broken Promise, 30 J. MGMT. 165 179–80 (2004).
Sincerity is also important to evaluations of excuses. Jerald Greenberg, Looking Fair vs. Being Far: Managing
Impressions of Organizational Justice, 12 RES. ORG. BEHAV. 111, 133 (1990). See generally Bandes, supra
note 40 (reviewing studies).
178. Jonathan R. Cohen, Apology and Organizations: Exploring an Example from Medical Practice, 27
FORDHAM URB. L.J. 1447, 1459 (2000).
179. Miller, supra note 159, at 538; see also Robert A. Baron, Attributions and Organizational Conflict:
The Mediating Role of Apparent Sincerity, 69 ORG. BEHAV. & HUM. DECISION PROCESSES 272 (1988); Erving
Goffman, On Cooling the Mark Out, 15 PSYCHIATRY 451 (1952).
180. Mark W. Bennett & Ira P. Robbins, Last Words: A Survey and Analysis of Federal Judges’ Views on
Allocution in Sentencing, 65 ALA. L. REV. 735, 752 (2014).
181. See supra notes 57–60 and accompanying text; see also Attorney Grievance Com’n of Maryland v.
Pennington, 876 A.2d 642, 661 (Md. 2005) (display of remorse seen as an attempt at damage control);
Statewide Grievance Committee v. Lafferty, No. CV 000070144S, 2000 WL 1474880 (Conn. Super. 2000) (at-
torney only apologized for a “technical” and “inadvertent” violation).
182. See, e.g., Bartlett, supra note 24, at 55.
183. See generally Taft, supra note 144.
184. See In re Coe, 903 S.W.2d 916, 918 (Mo. 1995) (en banc) (apology seemingly made to reduce discipli-
nary penalty).
185. See Robbennolt, supra note 153, at 358–59; Robbennolt, supra note 102 (unpublished data finding
association between the taking of responsibility and perceived sincerity).
186. The relevant “costs” could be compensation to the victim but could also involve other negative conse-
quences for the offender, such as cancelling important plans, forgoing profits or other opportunities, or legal ex-
posure. See, Yohsuke Ohtsubo & Esuka Watanabe, Do Sincere Apologies Need to Be Costly? Test of a Costly
Signaling Model of Apology, 30 EVOLUTION & HUM. BEHAV. 114, 118–20 (2018); Yohsuke Ohtsubo, Esuka
Watanabe, Jiyoon Kim, John T. Kulas, Hamdi Muluk, Gabriela Nazar, Feixue Wang & Jingyu Zhang, Are
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Conversely, apologies that are conditional or technical or vague seem less sin-
cere.187 Apologies given repeatedly with no changes in the underlying behavior
seem less sincere, while ongoing behavior consistent with the apology can bolster
the perceived sincerity of the apology.188 In this vein, a lawyer in a discipline
case might bolster the credibility of an apology by adopting office practices and
procedures that would prevent recurrence of the offense or by agreeing to sub-
stance abuse or mental health counseling.
Victims and others might also look for cues to sincerity in facial expressions,
body language, or demeanor.189 But people have a great deal of difficulty in accu-
rately assessing whether another person is being sincere. Despite conventional
wisdom to the contrary, people have difficulty reading emotions and it is quite
hard to determine whether someone is lying.190 Cultural differences, too, can
complicate evaluations of apologetic communication even further.191
Research has also shown that judges attempting to assess remorse in criminal
cases vary widely in their views of what cues indicate remorse—with the same
Costly Apologies Universally Perceived as Being Sincere? A Test of the Costly Apology-Perceived Sincerity
Relationship in Seven Countries, 10 J. EVOLUTIONARY PSYCHOL. 187 (2012); see also Yoksuke Ohtsubo,
Masahiro Matsunaga, Hiroki Tanaka, Kohta Suzuki, Fumio Kobayashi, Eiji Shibata, Reiko Hori, Tomohiro
Umemura & Hideki Ohira, Costly Apologies Communicate Conciliatory Intention: An FMRI Study on
Forgiveness in Response to Costly Apologies, 39 EVOLUTION & HUM. BEHAV. 249 (2018).
187. See supra note 156 and accompanying text.
188. See, e.g., Basil Halperin, Benjamin Ho, John A. List & Ian Muir, Toward an Understanding of the
Economics of Apologies: Evidence from a Large-Scale Natural Field Experiment (2019), http://www.nber.org/
papers/w25676.pdf [https://perma.cc/BCF5-L49X]; C. Harry Hui, Felicia L. Y. Lau, Karina L.C. Tsang & S.
Tess Pak, The Impact of Post-Apology Behavioral Consistency on Victim’s Forgiveness Intention: A Study of
Trust Violation Among Co-Workers, 41 J. APPLIED SOC. PSYCHOL. 1214, 1222–25 (2011); see also Simon et al.,
supra note 153, at 73 (noting ongoing behavior as signal of sincerity).
189. See, e.g., Bennett & Robbins, supra note 180, at 756; Corwin et al., Defendant Remorse, Need for
Affect, and Juror Sentencing Decisions, 40 J. AM. ACAD. PSYCHIATRY & L. 41, 46 (2012).
190. See generally Lisa Feldman Barrett, Ralph Adolphs, Stacy Marsella, Aleix M. Martinez & Seth D.
Pollak, Emotional Expressions Reconsidered: Challenges to Inferring Emotion from Human Facial
Movements, 20 PSYCHOL. SCI. PUB. INTEREST 1 (2019); Bella M. DePaulo, James J. Lindsay, Brian E. Malone,
Laura Muhlenbruck, Kelly Charlton & Harris Cooper, Cues to Deception, 129 PSYCHOL. BULL. 74 (2003);
Aldert Vrij, Pär Anders Granhag & Stephen Porter, Pitfalls and Opportunities in Nonverbal and Verbal Lie
Detection, 11 PSYCHOL. SCI. PUB. INT. 89 (2010). These difficulties in assessing demeanor can also open the
door to biases. See, e.g., Ronald S. Everett & Barbara C. Nienstedt, Race, Remorse, and Sentence Reduction: Is
Saying You’re Sorry Enough?, 16 JUST. Q. 99, 117 (1999); M. Eve Hanan, Remorse Bias, 83 MO. L. REV. 301
(2018); Rocksheng Zhong, Madelon Baranoski, Neal Feigenson, Larry Davidson, Alec Buchanan & Howard
V. Zonana, So You’re Sorry? The Role of Remorse in Criminal Law, 42 J. AM. ACAD. PSYCHIATRY & L. 39
(2014); see also Stephanos Bibas & Richard A. Bierschbach, Integrating Remorse and Apology into Criminal
Procedure, 114 YALE L.J. 85, 105 (2004) (noting concerns over “reward[ing] well-executed fakery and the
“acquired skill” of expressing “appropriate” attitudes in the courtroom” and bias in interpreting remorse).
191. See, e.g., William W. Maddux, Peter H. Kim, Tetsushi Okumura & Jeanne M. Brett, Cultural
Differences in the Function and Meaning of Apology, 16 INT’L NEGOT. 405, 412 (2011); David Matsumoto,
Cultural Similarities and Differences in Display Rules, 14 MOTIVATION & EMOTION 195, 205–08 (1990); see
also Ryan Fehr & Michele J. Gelfand,When Apologies Work: How Matching Apology Components to Victims’
Self-Construals Facilitates Forgiveness, 113 ORG. BEHAV. & HUM. DECISION PROCESSES 37, 40 (2010); Hong
Ren & Barbara Gray, Repairing Relationship Conflict: How Violation Types and Culture Influence the
Effectiveness of Restoration Rituals, 34 ACAD. MGMT. REV. 105, 106, 113 (2009).
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cues that signal remorse to some judges, signaling a lack of remorse to other
judges.192 Courtrooms and formal proceedings present additional difficulties for
judging remorse. As one judge admitted:
[Assessment of remorse] is very difficult, especially for judges who are just
seeing bits and slices when the person appears in these very formalized, styl-
ized settings. For judges to think, sitting up on the bench, that they can really
figure out whether this guy is remorseful, is remorseful enough, and is it real, it
is the height of arrogance.193
Existing procedures may provide limited opportunities to display remorse.
And even offenders who may be able to express remorse in a less formal or
charged setting may find it difficult to do (or do well) on cue or under the scrutiny
of decision makers in formal proceedings.194 One study found that judges seemed
to pay little attention to the ways that the contextual features of the criminal jus-
tice setting might also influence how remorse is or is not displayed.195
Sincerity is also clearly at issue when offenders are required, or even encour-
aged, to apologize. In other contexts, apologies may be requested by tort victims
or encouraged by mediators196 or courts may order an apology by a criminal de-
fendant as a condition of probation.197 The apologies generated by offenders
under compulsion tend to be less robust than those generated more spontane-
ously, conveying less remorse and taking less responsibility.198 But even when
192. Zhong et al., supra note 190, at 43–44; see also Green & Moriarty, supra note 154, at 154 (noting that
observers may disagree “about whether expressions of contrition are sufficiently sincere”); Kate Rossmanith,
Steven Tudor & Michael Proeve, Courtroom Contrition: How Do Judges Know?, 27 GRIFFITH L. REV. 366
(2019).
193. Zhong et al., supra note 190, at 43; see also Bibas & Bierschbach, supra note 190, at 98 (noting that
“[s]entencing allocutions . . . are tightly scheduled, hurried, vague, and often in front of a judge who did not pre-
side over the guilty plea.”).
194. See Rossmanith et al., supra note 192; see also Jung Jin Choi &Margaret Severson, “What! What Kind
of Apology is This?”: The Nature of Apology in Victim Offender Mediation, 31 CHILD. & YOUTH SERV. REV.
813, 819 (2009) (describing offenders’ difficulty in communicating sincere remorse to victims).
195. Zhong et al., supra note 190, at 46.
196. See Jennifer K. Robbennolt, The Effects of Negotiated and Delegated Apologies in Settlement
Negotiation, 37 L. & HUM. BEHAV. 128, 129 (2013).
197. See Brent T. White, Say You’re Sorry: Court-Ordered Apologies as a Civil Rights Remedy, 91
CORNELL L. REV. 1261, 1268–69 (2006). For discussion of ordered apologies across different countries, see
Robyn Carroll, Apologies as a Legal Remedy, 35 SYDNEY L. REV. 317 (2013); Robyn Carroll, You Can’t Order
Sorriness, So is There Any Value in an Ordered Apology - An Analysis of Ordered Apologies in Anti-
Discrimination Cases, 33 U.N.S.W.L.J. 360 (2010); Dai-Kwon Choi, Freedom of Conscience and the Court-
Ordered Apology for Defamatory Remarks, 8 CARDOZO J. INT’L & COMP. L. 205 (2000); Wannes
Vandenbussche, Rethinking Nonpecuniary Remedies for Defamation: The Case for Court-Ordered Apologies
(June 19, 2019), https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3236766 [https://perma.cc/B965-FXK2];
Gijs van Dijck, The Ordered Apology, 37 OXFORD J. LEGAL STUD. 562 (2017); Andrea Zwart-Hink, Arno
Akkermans & Kiliaan Van Wees, Compelled Apologies as a Legal Remedy: Some Thoughts from a Civil Law
Jurisdiction, 38 U.W. AUSTL. L. REV. 100 (2014).
198. Alana Saulnier & Diane Sivasubramaniam, Effects of Victim Presence and Coercion in Restorative
Justice: An Experimental Paradigm, 39 L. & HUM. BEHAV. 378, 383–84 (2015).
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they contain the same content, compelled apologies may be perceived as inher-
ently lacking in sincerity.199
At the same time, however, spontaneous or voluntary and coerced apologies
may have more in common than it first appears. Even voluntary apologies may be
insincere or offered for self-serving reasons, or simply perceived as insincere.200
And even ordered or coerced apologies may have positive effects. It is not hard to
find instances in which victims request, demand, and negotiate for apologies, sug-
gesting that they expect to find some value in them despite their lack of spontane-
ity.201 A number of studies, moreover, have found little difference in how
recipients react to apologies offered spontaneously as compared to those that are
offered at the urging of another or that are negotiated by the parties.202
Recipients, for example, tend to accept both spontaneous and coerced apolo-
gies.203 This may be, in part, due to apology “scripts,” which prescribe that the
giving of an apology ought to be followed by the acceptance of that apology and
that may constrain recipient reactions to coerced apologies, impelling them to
accept them despite their deficits.204 Victims may be “forced by social pressure to
forgive no less than the wrongdoer is forced to apologize. Or [the victim] forgives
because it is embarrassing not to once the wrongdoer has given a colorable
apology.”205 But recipients also seem to make similar internal judgments of spon-
taneous and coerced apologies, judging the offerors of either spontaneous or
coerced apologies to be more remorseful and likable and being more willing to
199. Even children see coerced apologies as communicating less remorse and as less likely to help repair
the harm. Craig E. Smith, Deborah Anderson & Anna Straussberger, Say You’re Sorry: Children Distinguish
Between Willingly Given and Coerced Expressions of Remorse, 64 MERRILL-PALMER Q. 275, 278 (2018).
200. See generally Dacher Keltner, Randall C. Young & Brenda N. Buswell, Appeasement in Human
Emotion, Social Practice, and Personality, 23 AGGRESSIVE BEHAV. 359 (1997). Ed Dauer sums up the contra-
dictions of insincere apologies when he notes that “[o]n the one hand, if practiced apologizing is effective, it
will be so only because it satisfies some need the recipients of the apologies actually have. On the other hand,
there is the nagging thought that insincerity camouflaged as contrition is, well, insincere.” Edward A. Dauer,
Apology in the Aftermath of Injury: Colorado’s “I’m Sorry” Law, 34 COLO. LAW. 47, 51 (2005).
201. See, e.g., Bibas & Bierschbach, supra note 190, at 143; Robbennolt, supra note 102, at 464;
Robbennolt, supra note 196, at 129.
202. See Jeffrey J. Rachlinski, Chris Guthrie, & Andrew J. Wistrich, Contrition in the Courtroom: Do
Apologies Affect Adjudication?, 98 CORNELL L. REV. 1189, 1226 (2013); Jane L. Risen & Thomas Gilovich,
Target and Observer Differences in the Acceptance of Questionable Apologies, 92 J. PERSONALITY & SOC.
PSYCHOL. 418, 421, 423–24 (2007); Robbennolt, supra note 196, at 131. One study found that spontaneous
apology was seen as no more sincere and was predicted to be less effective than a requested apology, perhaps
because the request gave the victim the opportunity to express his or her perspective prior to the apology.
Peyton & Goei, supra note 162, at 423.
203. Risen & Gilovich, supra note 202, at 421, 423–34; see also BATTISTELLA, supra note 156, at 193
(“[W]hile it would be high-minded to prescribe sincerity over instrumentality, that prescription would not
reflect either reality or utility.”).
204. See Mark Bennett & Christopher Dewberry, “I’ve said I’m sorry, haven’t I?” A Study of the Identity
Implications and Constraints that Apologies Create for Their Recipients, 13 CURRENT PSYCHOL. 10 (1994);
Risen & Gilovich, supra note 202, at 419. Observers, in contrast, are more likely than victim-recipients to dis-
tinguish between and react more favorably to voluntary apologies (more liking, less desire to punish, more will-
ing to work with) than to coerced apologies. Id., at 421, 423–24.
205. WILLIAM IAN MILLER, FAKING IT 92 (2003).
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work with them in the future than offenders who do not apologize.206 Because the
wrongdoer’s giving of an apology reflects the recipient’s worth and deservingness
of amends, recipients are motivated to believe them. Likewise, recipients’ desire
to see themselves as kind-hearted people who are willing to forgive, can cause
them to credit even coerced apologies.207 The fundamental attribution error,
moreover, inclines people to attribute other people’s behavior to dispositional,
rather than situational factors.208 For this reason, recipients may tend to credit the
sincerity of the apology, rather than attributing it to the circumstances that elicited
it.209
Other studies have found that recipients have more favorable reactions to spon-
taneous or voluntary apologies than to compelled or ordered apologies, but that
recipients may still find value in coerced apologies as compared to no apology at
all.210 Apologies that are offered with little or with feigned sincerity, offered
grudgingly, negotiated by the parties, or even ordered by a court might still serve
important purposes. Such statements of apology, for example, might provide vic-
tims with an acknowledgement of the wrongdoing and its consequences. Victims
might find some consolation in hearing the offender articulate that acknowledg-
ment.211 One victim of discrimination who refused to settle his discrimination
claim without an apology explained: “I know for a fact it won’t be sincere at this
point. I just want them to acknowledge what they did was wrong. They may not
believe it, but at least I could say I have it in writing that [they] admitted that
what [they] did was wrong.”212 Requiring such acknowledgement can signal that
the injured person is valued by the community and should be treated as such.213
206. Risen & Gilovich, supra note 202, at 421, 423–34.
207. Id. at 419, 427.
208. See generally RICHARD E. NISBETT & LEE ROSS, HUMAN INFERENCE: STRATEGIES AND
SHORTCOMINGS OF SOCIAL JUDGMENT (1980); LEE ROSS & RICHARD E. NISBETT, THE PERSON AND THE
SITUATION 4 (1991); Lee Ross, The Intuitive Psychologist and His Shortcomings: Distortions in the Attribution
Process, 10 ADV. EXPERIMENTAL SOC. PSYCHOL. 173 (1977).
209. See Risen & Gilovich, supra note 202, at 432; Robbennolt, supra note 102, at 508.
210. See, e.g., Alfred Allan, Dianne McKillop & Robyn Carroll, Parties’ Perceptions of Apologies in
Resolving Equal Opportunity Complaints, 17 PSYCHIATRY, PSYCHOL., & L. 538, 544 (2010); Alayna Jehle,
Monica K. Miller, Markus Kemmelmeier & Jonathan Maskaly, How Voluntariness of Apologies Affects Actual
and Hypothetical Victims’ Perceptions of the Offender, 152 J. SOC. PSYCHOL. 727, 735–37 (2012); Weiner et
al., supra note 20, at 299, 305; see also Carroll, supra note 197 (summarizing purposes of apology orders in
Australia); van Dijck, supra note 197 at 507 (arguing that “[t]he mere fact that court-ordered apologies are
sought suggests that they serve a purpose”).
211. See Allan et al., supra note 210, at 544 (describing a range of complainant reactions to non-voluntary
apologies).
212. White, supra note 197, at 1272; see also MICHAEL PROEVE & STEVEN TUDOR, REMORSE:
PSYCHOLOGICAL AND JURISPRUDENTIAL PERSPECTIVES 203 (2010) (noting that “there is a certain value in sim-
ply seeing that the offender recognizes that other people think his actions were wrong and expect expressions
of remorse and apology from him”).
213. The sincerity of the apology might matter less for these purposes. See, e.g., LAZARE, supra note 131, at
39 (noting that when a public apology is about declaring the offense for the record, “the question of sincerity
may never arise”).
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The apology ritual might serve as a measure of punishment.214 Affirmation of the
violated norms can also reinforce and signal the importance of those norms to vic-
tims, offenders, other lawyers, and the broader community.
The effects of compelled apologies on the offender are understudied and will
likely vary across cases. In some cases, being pushed to account for their behavior
might provide offenders with occasion to re-examine it.215 Such reexamination
might facilitate learning and, ultimately, better practice. Recognition of error
may lead to feelings of guilt, which may also prompt better behavior going for-
ward.216 It is possible that over time, the apology will influence the offender’s
attitudes and generate feelings of remorse.217
On the other hand, some offenders may chalk their apology up to the external
forces that compelled them to give it, missing out on an opportunity for learn-
ing.218 To the extent that being forced to apologize is experienced by the lawyer
as humiliating, the lawyer might become even more alienated from the discipline
process and the organized legal profession.219 And it is possible that forced apolo-
gies could trigger feelings of shame, which tends to be associated with denial and
defensiveness. Shame, in contrast to guilt, is associated with a tendency to con-
tinue engaging in maladaptive behavior.220
214. See Nick Smith, Against Court-Ordered Apologies, 16 NEW CRIM. L. REV. 1, 49 (2013) (noting that
“Kant justifies court-ordered apologies because offenders . . . deserve to suffer the negative emotions associated
with such rituals”); see also Minneapolis v. Richardson, 239 N.W.2d 197, 206 (Minn. 1976) (describing a
court-ordered apology as “calculated to humiliate and debase its writer and will succeed in producing only his
resentment—an emotion not particularly conducive to the advancement of human rights”).
215. See, e.g., C. Daniel Batson, Elizabeth R. Thompson, Greg Seuferling, Heather Whitney & Jon A.
Strongman, Moral Hypocrisy: Appearing Moral to Oneself Without Being So, 77 J. PERSONALITY & SOC.
PSYCHOL. 525, 529 (1999) (noting that such accountability may “heighten awareness of discrepancies between
behavior and salient personal standards, creating pressure to act in accord with standards”). See generally
PROEVE & TUDOR, supra note 212, at 205 (arguing that the expression of remorse might be a learning experi-
ence that helps to prompt the experience of remorse); Green & Moriarty, supra note 154, at 170 (arguing that
“[r]equiring lawyers to explain their past behavior and account for the ethical lapses might be beneficial in pre-
venting future unethical and deceptive behavior”).
216. See Hosser et al., supra note 166, at 146; Tangney et al., supra note 166, at 801–02. See generally Roy
F. Baumeister, Arlene M. Stillwell & Todd F. Heatherton, Guilt: An Interpersonal Approach, 115 PSYCHOL.
BULL. 243 (1994).
217. See generally FESTINGER, supra note 107; COGNITIVE DISSONANCE: REEXAMINING A PIVOTAL THEORY
IN PSYCHOLOGY (Eddie Harmon Jones ed., 2019).
218. See Festinger & Carlsmith, supra note 124; Saulnier & Sivasubramaniam, supra note 198, at 380 (not-
ing that the opportunity to attribute the apology to an external force—such as an incentive or order—may “nul-
lify the offender’s ability to experience desirable, belief-changing outcomes tied to the act of apologizing”).
219. See Minneapolis v. Richardson, 239 N.W.2d 197, 206 (Minn. 1976) (noting the potential for ordered
apologies to “humiliate and debase” and produce “resentment”); Christopher Bennett, Taking the Sincerity Out
of Saying Sorry: Restorative Justice as Ritual, 23 J. APP. PHIL. 127, 130 (noting that for an offender to “swallow
his dissent and make an apology that is not true to what he believes” can be “humiliating”); Smith, supra note
214, at 49 (arguing that compelled apologies might be more likely to alienate than reintegrate); see also
Hodgins & Liebeskind, supra note 23 at 297–316 (exploring the role of “reproach” in eliciting defensive moti-
vations in offenders).
220. Hosser et al., supra note 166, at 146; Tangney et al., supra note 166, at 801–802; see also Brandon J.
Griffin, Jaclyn M. Moloney, Jeffrey D. Green, Everett L. Worthington, Jr., Brianne Cork, June P. Tangney,
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IV. INCORPORATING APOLOGIES INTO THE LAWYER DISCIPLINE PROCESS
Lawyer apologies can help repair the lawyer-client relationship, improve the law-
yer discipline experience for the complainant, and provide lawyers with emotional
relief and an opportunity for growth.221 In some cases, apologies can also communi-
cate important messages to the profession and to the public.222 But apologies are
only appropriate in certain cases. Some lawyer discipline complaints lack merit.
They are filed by clients who are unhappy with case results, by opposing counsel for
strategic reasons, or by opposing parties who are unhappy with the tactics or goals
the lawyers pursued.223 In such cases, lawyer apologies are rarely warranted.224
There are other instances, however, when lawyer apologies should be encouraged—
or even required—at various junctions in the discipline process.
A. EARLY DISPUTE RESOLUTION
Lawyer apologies can be usefully employed when a potential complainant con-
tacts an ACAP or a disciplinary authority that attempts to informally resolve
minor matters before a complaint is filed. In many cases, the source of unhappi-
ness is simply a failure to communicate with clients.225 As noted, a lawyer will
Daryl R. Van Tongeren, Don E. Davis & Joshua N. Hook, Perpetrators’ Reactions to Perceived Interpersonal
Wrongdoing: The Associations of Guilt and Shame with Forgiving, Punishing, and Excusing Oneself, 15 SELF
& IDENTITY 1, 2 (2016).
221. The focus in this section is on apologies to clients, although clients are not the only complainants. In
many cases the complainant is a member of the client’s family who may be paying the bill or who for other rea-
sons is acting on behalf of the client. See LEVIN & FORTNEY, supra note 59, at 7–8. In other cases, it is the
opposing party who brings the complaint. Id. The benefits of apologies to these complainants are likely to be
similar. Less often, the complainant is a lawyer or a judge. Id. The effects of apologies to these latter complai-
nants may be more modest but may also help to repair these relationships.
222. Apologies can signal acceptable norms of behavior to the profession and signal to the public that the
profession views the public as deserving of respect. Apologies may also provide greater incentives for the pub-
lic to file grievances when misconduct occurs because the apology provides some actual benefit to the
complainant.
223. See Leslie C. Levin, The Case for Less Secrecy in Lawyer Discipline, 20 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 1, 23
(2007).
224. Likewise, some adverse outcomes experienced by medical patients are due to negligence and others
are not. When negligence is lacking, medical providers ought not be expected to take responsibility for wrong-
doing. Instead, they might more appropriately offer an explanation about what happened, express regret for the
outcome, and convey sympathy to the patient. Jennifer K. Robbennolt, Apologies and Medical Error, 467
CLINICAL ORTHOPAEDICS & RELATED RES. 376, 380 (2009). Medical communication and resolution programs
are based on this notion. See, e.g., Thomas H. Gallagher, Michelle M. Mello, William M. Sage, Sigall K. Bell,
Timothy B. McDonald & Eric J. Thomas, Can Communication-and-Resolution Programs Achieve Their
Potential? Five Key Questions, 37 HEALTH AFF. 1845 (2018); Kachalia et al., supra note 30, at 1836.
225. See, e.g., Practice Assistance and Improvement Program, LA. ST. B. ASS’N, https://www.lsba.org/
PracticeAssistance/ [https://perma.cc/B38S-DW7B] (noting that complaints focus on minor problems such as
lawyer-client communications); Consumer Assistance Program (CAP), BD. OF PROF’L RESPONSIBILITY OF THE
SUP. CT. OF TENN., https://www.tbpr.org/for-the-public/consumer-assistance-program [https://perma.cc/
GMU8-V8CE] (noting that “many complaints are a result of communication problems”); Stephen E.
Schemenauer, What We’ve Got Here. . .Is a Failure. . .to Communicate: A Statistical Analysis of the Nation’s
Most Common Ethical Complaint, 30 HAMLINE L. REV. 629, 679 (2007) (noting that failure to communicate
was the top complaint in Texas Client Attorney Assistance Program).
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sometimes spontaneously apologize to facilitate resolution of a problem.226 If
ACAPs were to more systematically educate lawyers about the benefits of lawyer
apologies and encourage lawyers to apologize, they might help to resolve more
disputes between potential complainants and lawyers and reduce the number of
disciplinary complaints that are ultimately filed. Apologies at this stage might
also help to repair more lawyer-client relationships. True apologies—which
would include fixing the problem that gave rise to the complainant’s decision to
contact the ACAP—could also help, more generally, to restore the client’s confi-
dence in the legal profession.
There is some tension, however, between promoting lawyer apologies and the
purposes of ACAPs, which are to resolve minor conflicts, reduce the number of
disciplinary complaints filed against lawyers, and weed out frivolous com-
plaints.227 Indeed, the success of ACAPs is often assessed by looking at decreases
in filed discipline complaints or the number of matters that are informally
resolved.228 For these reasons, the focus of ACAPs and other intake screening has
been on resolving matters rather than assigning blame.229 And there are instances
where the potential grievances arise out of misunderstandings that are not the
lawyer’s fault. In other cases, however, where the lawyer has failed to perform
adequately—for example, in communicating with clients or attending to work
diligently—systematically encouraging apologies can help resolve conflict.
Likewise, matters that some lawyer discipline authorities decline to handle—
such as lawyer rudeness230—could be constructively addressed with apologies. In
a regulatory system that provides no monetary compensation, a sincere apology
would provide some psychological satisfaction to many complainants and rein-
force the lawyer’s commitment to improved practice. Even a lawyer apology
offered to avert a discipline complaint—which may not be entirely sincere—
could provide the potential complainant with the feeling of being respected, help
repair the relationship, and help restore confidence in the lawyer and the legal
profession.
226. See supra note 72 and accompanying text.
227. See, e.g., John Freeman, Good News on the Ethics Front, S. CAR. LAW., Jan-Feb. 2002, at 11, 11;
Jeanine P. Timothy, The First Decade: The Consumer Assistance Program Has Proven Itself to be a Valuable
Program, UTAH B.J., Nov.-Dec. 2007, at 13, 13; Seana Willing, The Texas Attorney Discipline System: A Look
at the Initial Impact of Sunset Review Recommendations, 82 TEX. B.J. 844, 844 (2019).
228. See, e.g., Freeman, supra note 227, at 11; Willing, supra note 227, at 844.
229. See supra notes 68–69 and accompanying text.
230. In some jurisdictions, lawyer disciplinary authorities decline to address complaints about rudeness.
See, e.g., Complain About a Lawyer’s Conduct, WYO. ST. B., https://www.wyomingbar.org/for-the-public/
attorney-complaints/complain-about-a-lawyers-conduct/ [https://perma.cc/MA2P-7P8X]; How to File a
Complaint Against a Lawyer, VA. ST. B., https://www.vsb.org/site/regulation/inquiry [https://perma.cc/3M6J-
7J2W]. Some ACAPs also decline to address these issues. See Client Assistance Program of the Office of the
General Counsel (CAP), supra note 62, at 6 (stating that if CAP is called about lawyer rudeness, it “advises the
consumer that such behavior is not condoned and is unprofessional, but does not violate the Georgia Rules of
Professional Conduct”).
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There are additional reasons, however, why ACAPs may not want to system-
atically encourage lawyers to apologize in all matters in which the lawyer
engaged in wrongdoing. In order to work effectively, ACAPs need lawyers to be
cooperative. For this reason, some ACAPs also bill themselves as working to
help lawyers resolve problems with their clients.231 A practice of routinely
encouraging lawyer apologies could cause some lawyers to view the programs
even more defensively than some already do,232 which may increase lawyer reluc-
tance to cooperate. In addition, systematic efforts to elicit lawyer apologies could
delay the resolution of minor issues, such as the return of client papers, which the
client may need done as quickly as possible. In such cases, where the attorney-
client relationship has ended, an apology may be less important, while a speedy
resolution of the problem may be a greater concern. ACAPs that can effectively
educate and coach attorneys about the importance and benefits of apologizing
will likely be the most successful in achieving their goals.233
A slightly different scenario arises once a disciplinary complaint is filed. The
filing of a complaint may signal a complete breakdown in the relationship from
the client’s perspective and it raises the stakes for the lawyer. There may be more
work for apologies to do to repair the relationship in such cases, and in some
instances such repair may not be easy or even desired. But even at this stage apol-
ogies can provide acknowledgment of harm and wrongdoing, show respect, reaf-
firm norms, signal desire for improvement, and aid dispute resolution.
How hard should disciplinary authorities advocate for a lawyer to apologize at
this point? Some Australian regulators suggest to lawyers, with different degrees
of force, that they apologize at this juncture. In Victoria, some disputes are
resolved through informal dispute resolution which includes suggesting to re-
spondent lawyers that they apologize to the complainant.234 In Queensland, the
231. See, e.g., Mark D. Killian, ACAP Helps Lawyers and Clients Sort Through Their Differences, FLA. B.
NEWS (Mar. 1, 2016), https://www.floridabar.org/the-florida-bar-news/acap-helps-lawyers-and-clients-sort-
through-their-differences-2/ [https://perma.cc/WH88-53XC] (noting that job of ACAP “is to weed out many
baseless complaints against lawyers” and that they “often are able to cool off angry clients and save some
Florida attorneys from getting involved in the Bar’s disciplinary system”); Client Assistance Program of the
Office of General Counsel (CAP), supra note 62 (explaining how the ACAP assists attorneys as well as
consumers). This is also reflected in the names of some of the programs, which are sometimes called “Client-
Attorney Assistance Programs.” See, e.g., Client-Attorney Assistance Program (CAAP), supra note 62.
Louisiana’s Attorney-Client Assistance program attempts “to facilitate a resolution of the complaint to the
satisfaction of all parties.” Practice Assistance and Improvement Program, supra note 225.
232. See infra note 276 and accompanying text.
233. See generally TAVUCHIS, supra note 21, at 64 (discussing the pedagogy of apology and the role of a third
party as apology “coach”); Choi & Severson, supra note 194, at 819 (discussing role of preparation and education in
fostering and communicating sincere apologies); May& Plews-Ogan, supra note 143, at 452 (describing the benefits
to physicians of talking over an error with an expert or mentor); Michelle M. Mello, Richard C. Boothman, Timothy
McDonald, Jeffrey Driver, Alan Lembitz, Darren Bouwmeester, Benjamin Dunlap & Thomas Gallagher,
Communication-and-Resolution Programs: The Challenges and Lessons Learned From Six Early Adopters, 33
HEALTH AFFAIRS 20, 25 (2014) (discussing the importance and challenges of winning over skeptical doctors to a
communication-and-resolution approach); Mello et al., supra note 29 (same).
234. See Linda Haller, Restorative Lawyer Discipline in Australia, 12 NEV. L. J. 316, 329 (2012).
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regulator put lawyers on notice that he might dismiss certain complaints rather
than pursue them if the lawyer apologizes.235 This approach is likely to generate
some insincere apologies, but would still allow the complainant to hear the re-
spondent-lawyer acknowledge the wrongdoing and the harm it caused, signal that
the regulator values the complainant, and highlight shared underlying values.
Even an insincere apology at this juncture might facilitate repair of the relation-
ship and push the attorney to critically examine his behavior.
There are, of course, situations in which ACAPs or disciplinary authorities
should not encourage an apology to induce a client to forgo filing or pursuing a
discipline complaint.236 Under the rules of the ACAPs, they will not do so where
serious misconduct is alleged.237 In addition, apologies should not be encouraged
in lieu of discipline where a lawyer repeatedly engages in minor violations of
rules of professional conduct. For example, some lawyers who fail to return
phone calls to one client may repeat this behavior with other clients.
Unfortunately, some ACAP programs do not retain records for any significant
length of time,238 making it difficult for repeat offenders to be identified and more
appropriately sanctioned by disciplinary authorities.
B. DIVERSION CONDITIONS
Diversion is another juncture at which disciplinary authorities should routinely
consider whether a lawyer apology is appropriate. Lawyers who are offered
diversion in lieu of discipline are generally not required to admit to miscon-
duct.239 They do, however, enter into diversion agreements in which they commit
to satisfy certain conditions.240 These conditions are mostly rehabilitative, such
as attending law office management programs, ethics courses, or participating in
235. Id. at 328; see also Robert Brittan, Regulating the Legal Profession in Queensland, Australia 11
(2017), https://www.lsc.qld.gov.au/__data/assets/pdf_file/0008/542654/regulating-the-legal-profession-in-
queensland-australia.pdf [https://perma.cc/8CXW-2KZ8] (reporting number of apologies secured without
resort to disciplinary action).
236. Some offenders simply are not candidates for restorative justice approaches and should be more
harshly sanctioned for their offenses. See Jeffrey W. Stempel, Paradox Lost: The Potential of Restorative
Justice Discipline – With a Cautionary Call for Making Distinctions, 12 NEV. L. REV. 350, 361 (2012).
237. See, e,g. Attorney/Consumer Assistance Program, The Discipline Process, ST. B. ARIZ., azbar.org
[https://perma.cc/QP8H-YG4D] (last visited June 15, 2021); Consumer Assistance Program (CAP), supra note
225.
238. Client Assistance Program of the Office of the General Counsel (CAP), supra note 62 (stating that
CAP retains original correspondence for 30 days); Timothy, supra note 227, at 14 (noting that if matters are
successfully resolved, contents of file “are completely destroyed”).
239. See, e.g., UTAH SUP. CT. R. PROF’L PRACTICE 14-533(g) (2016). Note that this differs from various
types of “restorative justice” programs, in which acceptance of responsibility for wrongdoing is often required
for participation.
240. See, e.g., KAN. RULES RELATING TO DISCIPLINE OF ATT’YS R. 203(d) (iv) (2019); LA. RULES FOR
LAWYER DISCIPLINARY ENFORCEMENT § 11(H) (2019).
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lawyer assistance programs.241 The conditions may also include fee arbitration or
fee restitution, and very rarely, an apology.242
The identity of lawyers who agree to diversion is treated as confidential.243 The
complainants may be told that the lawyer was referred to a diversion program and
completed the program requirements, but do not usually learn the terms of the
agreement.244 Where the complainant was a client, the lawyer-client relationship
has likely ended.245 In such cases, apologies are not needed to repair the relation-
ship, but may at least give the complainant the satisfaction of feeling like the
harm that the lawyer caused has been acknowledged. An apology may also cause
respondent lawyers to confront that their misconduct caused real harm.
Most states that utilize diversion in lieu of discipline do not expressly provide
for apologies as a condition of diversion. Nevertheless, their rules may permit
apologies to be one of the conditions of diversion where they provide for the use
of any other “corrective course of action” to address the lawyer’s misconduct.246
Some lawyers may be wary of making apologies, however, because evidenti-
ary rules traditionally permit the introduction of apology statements against a
party as a party admission.247 This exposes lawyers to the risk that an apology
could be used against them in a subsequent legal malpractice case. But this may
not be a substantial problem, at least in the diversion context. As a practical mat-
ter, the types of minor misconduct that give rise to diversion are unlikely to serve
as the basis for a legal malpractice lawsuit.248 Jurisdictions that seek to use apolo-
gies as part of lawyer discipline should nevertheless be aware of potential lawyer
concern and consider options for how to address it. One approach might be to
leave attorneys to assess the risks for themselves. Another might be to adopt a
241. MODEL RULES FOR LAWYER DISCIPLINARY ENFORCEMENT R. 11 (G)(1); COLO. R. CIV. P. 251.13(a)
(2020); D.C. CT. OF APPEALS RULES GOVERNING THE BAR R. XI, § 8.1 (d) (2020); ARIZ. ATT’Y DIVERSION
GUIDELINES VI (A)(3)(e) (2011), https://www.azbar.org/media/m4zh1syl/diversion-guidelines.pdf [https://
perma.cc/BVT6-R3MF]; supra note 15 and accompanying text.
242. See, e.g., COLO. R. CIV. P. 251.13 (c) (2020); N.D. RULES FOR LAWYER DISCIPLINE 6.6 (E)(9); N.M.
RULES GOVERNING DISCIPLINE 17-206 (H)(1)(b), (H)(3)(f); UTAH SUP. CT. RULES PROF’L. PRACTICE 14-533
(a)(7) (2020).
243. See, e.g., COLO. R. CIV. P. 251.13 (i) (2020); ARIZ. ATTORNEY DIVERSION GUIDELINES VI (11).
244. See, e.g., N.M. RULES GOVERNING DISCIPLINE 17-206 (H)(7) (2018); UTAH SUP. CT. RULES PROF’L
PRACTICE 14-533 (e), (f)(1) (2019). An exception might occur when the complainant is involved in the comple-
tion of one of the diversion conditions, such as fee arbitration.
245. Even when the complainant contacts an ACAP program, some lawyers have “immediately withdrawn”
from representation or become angry with clients. See Timothy, supra note 227, at 14. Diversion is an even
more stressful experience for lawyers because a complaint has been filed and disciplinary authorities believe
that lawyer misconduct occurred.
246. See, e.g., N.D. RULES FOR LAWYER DISCIPLINE 6.6 (E) (11); UTAH SUP. CT. RULES PROF’L PRACTICE
14-533 (a)(9); WASH. RULES FOR ENFORCEMENT OF LAWYER CONDUCT 6.1 (2014).
247. See Robbennolt, supra note 102, at 466–67.
248. This same evidentiary issue arises, however, when lawyer apologies are offered for more significant
lawyer misconduct.
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rule which provides that apologies cannot be used against the respondent in sub-
sequent discipline or legal malpractice proceedings.249
At this stage, lawyers may agree to apologize as a confidential condition of
diversion because they believe it is appropriate or because it will resolve the need
to proceed to a disciplinary hearing. In some cases, the lawyer will be genuinely
contrite, creating the most potential for the apology to benefit both the recipient
and the lawyer.250 In other cases, the lawyer’s apology may not be sincere, but
will be offered because it is expedient. Even here, however, the apology may
serve to acknowledge the wrongdoing and its harm and to reaffirm the norms
underlying the rules of professional conduct.
Requiring an apology as a condition of diversion raises the need to document
that the lawyer-respondent has made the apology as required. That could mean
encouraging written apologies that could be provided to the complainant and the
regulator, or apologies offered in face-to-face meetings with a representative of
the regulator in attendance. In-person apologies offered at any stage allow the
complainant to have a voice, provide more space for give and take between the
lawyer-respondent and the complainant, allow the lawyer-respondent to adapt
and respond to the ways in which the complainant reacts to the apology, and may
provide victims with greater “emotional and ceremonial meaning.”251 Face-to-
face apologies may also help respondents more fully grasp the consequences of
his behavior for the complainant.252 The prevalence of apologies offered in medi-
ation or other restorative justice processes suggests that apologies can be effec-
tive even in the presence of third party observers.253
249. Many jurisdictions have adopted apology laws that preclude the use of some statements of apology as
evidence of liability in civil proceedings, but most only protect statements of sympathy and condolence and
some are limited to cases involving medical errors. Only five jurisdictions have rules that preclude the admissi-
bility of statements expressing responsibility for wrongdoing, and these are limited to situations involving
health care providers. See Benjamin J. McMichael, R. Lawrence Van Horn & W. Kip Viscusi, “Sorry” Is
Never Enough: How State Apology Laws Fail to Reduce Medical Malpractice Liability Risk, 71 STAN. L. REV.
341, 346 (2019); see also Jonathan R. Cohen, Legislating Apology: Pros and Cons, 70 U. CIN. L. REV. 819
(2012); see generally Jennifer Robbennolt, 45 COURT REV. 90, 91 (2008) (describing purpose of apology laws).
250. It is possible that this will be particularly true if the complainant is not aware that the apology is one of
the conditions of diversion as the apology may be perceived as more sincere. As noted above, however, not all
studies have found differences in recipients’ reactions to spontaneous or encouraged or negotiated apologies.
Those that do find that coerced apologies may still be more effective than no apology at all. See supra notes
196–203 and accompanying text. Future research should continue to explore recipients’ views of these types of
coerced or incentivized apologies.
251. See, e.g., LAZARE, supra note 131, at 39; SMITH, supra note 150, at 77.
252. See, e.g., Bibas & Bierschbach, supra note 190, at 115 (arguing that “[b]y humanizing the transgres-
sion and its consequences, face-to-face interaction can break down pride, fear, pain, anxiety, and other barriers
to accepting responsibility and thus pave the way for genuine repentance.”).
253. MARK S. UMBREIT, VICTIM MEETS OFFENDER: THE IMPACT OF RESTORATIVE JUSTICE AND MEDIATION
(1994); Chris Stern Hyman & Clyde B. Schechter, Mediating Medical Malpractice Lawsuits Against
Hospitals: New York City’s Pilot Project, 25 HEALTH AFF. 1394 (2006); Deborah Levi, The Role of Apology in
Mediation, 72 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1165 (1997); Carl D. Schneider, What It Means to Be Sorry: The Power of
Apology in Mediation, 17 MEDIATION Q. 265 (2000).
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At the same time, face-to-face apologies can be daunting for offenders and run
the risk that the lawyer will execute the apology badly. Lawyer who undercut
their attempts to apologize with excuses or justifications, offer conditional apolo-
gies or statements that blame the complainant (“I’m sorry if you misunderstood”),
or vent their anger at the complainant run the risk of further disaffecting the com-
plainant and inflicting additional injury. Written apologies afford an opportunity
for offenders to carefully attend to the content of the apology in a way that is
more difficult to do in a more fluid conversation that proceeds in “emotional fits
and starts with garbled content.”254 Some lawyer-respondents might prepare a
written apology that they deliver in person. In such cases, the work done to think
through and craft a written apology may help to prepare an offender to have a
more productive interaction with the victim.255
C. NEGOTIATED DISCIPLINE SANCTIONS
Negotiated sanctions are the product of negotiations between disciplinary
counsel and a lawyer-respondent where the lawyer engaged in sufficiently serious
conduct that a discipline sanction is warranted. Like plea bargains in criminal
cases, negotiated sanctions sometimes result in a more favorable outcome than a
lawyer would receive after a full disciplinary hearing. Negotiated sanctions typi-
cally include a sworn statement by the lawyer admitting to the misconduct that
occurred.256 A disciplinary board or a court usually reviews and must approve the
negotiated sanction.257
When negotiating sanctions, disciplinary counsel should consider seeking an
apology from the respondent, especially where the complainant is a client or
another member of the public. This would require a shift in the orientation of dis-
ciplinary counsel’s office, because the focus of lawyer discipline has traditionally
been on public protection and not on the interests of individual complainants.258
Some states would also need to amend their discipline rules to provide for apolo-
gies as part of a discipline sanction.259 Lawyer apologies would produce the same
salutary effects as they would in the pre-complaint and diversion contexts,
254. SMITH, supra note 150, at 78.
255. Id.
256. See, e.g., D.C. CT. OF APPEALS RULES GOVERNING THE BAR R. XI, § 12.1 (b) (1) (ii) (2021);
Hernandez v. Fiedler, No. 19-0088 (Ct. Statewide Griev. Comm. Sept. 27, 2019), https://www.jud.ct.gov/sgc/
decisions/19-0089.pdf [https://perma.cc/MD9W-EXAM].
257. See, e.g., D.C. CT. OF APPEALS RULES GOVERNING THE BAR R. XI, §§ 6 (a) (3), 12.1 (c) (2020); MASS.
SUP. JUD. CT. R. 4:01(8)(1)(c) (2020).
258. See, e.g., ABA STANDARDS FOR IMPOSING LAWYER SANCTIONS, Standard 1.1 (1992); Fred Zacharias,
The Purpose of Lawyer Discipline, 45 WM. &MARY L. REV. 675, 677 n.1 (2003).
259. Most states’ disciplinary rules expressly provide for the sanctions that can be imposed. See, e.g., MASS.
SUP. JUD. CT. R. 4:01(4) (2020) (stating that discipline may be by disbarment, suspension, public reprimand or
admonition). In some jurisdictions, the rule language is flexible enough to encompass an apology as part of pro-
bation or in connection with other sanctions. See, e.g., D.C. CT. OF APPEALS RULES GOVERNING THE BAR R.
XI, § 3(a)(7), (b) (2020). In others, they are not.
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providing complainants with the feeling that their harm has been acknowledged,
even if they cannot obtain compensation for the harm. At the same time, lawyer
apologies would not, in most cases, undermine efforts to protect the public and
may further incentivize some individuals to bring lawyer wrongdoing to the
attention of disciplinary authorities.260
As in the diversion context, attorneys may be guarded or unwilling to apolo-
gize for fear that an apology will be used in subsequent legal proceedings.261
These fears, however, may be exaggerated. Most lawyers who are sanctioned do
not also face malpractice litigation.262 Individuals with viable malpractice claims
tend to refrain from filing grievances because they want to ensure that their for-
mer lawyers remain in practice so those lawyers can pay a malpractice judg-
ment.263 Legal malpractice lawyers advise their clients not to file grievances until
after the malpractice action has concluded to avoid stiffening the defendant’s re-
sistance to the malpractice claim.264 The sanctions themselves, moreover, may be
admissible in later legal proceedings, even if the apology is not.265 The risks of
admission of an apology, therefore, seem less stark in this context.
How hard should disciplinary counsel “push” for an apology as part of a nego-
tiated settlement where a lawyer-respondent does not initially wish to provide
one?266 A demand by disciplinary counsel for a lawyer to apologize to a com-
plainant may be experienced as a threat to identity by some respondents who
wish to continue to view themselves as good lawyers who simply made a minor
mistake.267 Indeed, some lawyers will be incapable of admitting—even to them-
selves—that they made a mistake at all.268 Insisting that a reluctant lawyer apolo-
gize could impede disciplinary counsel’s ability to reach a negotiated sanction or
require the diversion of resources to a hearing when a negotiated sanction was
otherwise possible. In either case, it may take more time to resolve the matter.
260. On the importance of perceived legitimacy for cooperation with institutions, see generally Tom R.
Tyler & Jonathan Jackson, Popular Legitimacy and the Exercise of Legal Authority: Motivating Compliance,
Cooperation, and Engagement, 20 PSYCHOL. PUB. POL’Y & L. 78 (2014); Tom R. Tyler, Psychological
Perspectives on Legitimacy and Legitimation, 57 ANN. REV. PSYCHOL. 375 (2006).
261. See supra note 247 and accompanying text.
262. Some jurisdictions effectively discourage the public from filing disciplinary complaints where mal-
practice occurred. See, e.g., Attorney Discipline, IOWA JUD. BRANCH, https://www.iowacourts.gov/opr/
attorneys/attorney-discipline [https://perma.cc/L9CD-FH7D] (last visited July 8, 2021) (stating that if client is
damaged by a lawyer’s negligence “another lawyer should be consulted” and that the “Attorney Disciplinary
Board has no jurisdiction of a negligence claim”). As one regulator noted, “[i]n the majority of situations
involving potential malpractice actions, the lawyer disciplinary system will play little or no role.” Martin A.
Cole,When Malpractice is an Ethics Issue, BENCH & BAR (Dec. 2002).
263. See, e.g., In re Himmel, 533 N.E.2d 790, 791–92 (Ill. 1988).
264. SeeKRITZER & VIDMAR, supra note 10, at 59.
265. See, e.g., Roy v. Diamond, 16 S.W.3d 783, 790–91 (Tenn. App. 1999).
266. Compelled apologies raise First Amendment issues. See infra notes 296–299 and accompanying text.
Pressing for an apology would not violate the lawyer-respondent’s First Amendment rights, however, because
the lawyer could decline to apologize and proceed to a hearing.
267. See supra notes 105–07 and accompanying text.
268. ABEL, supra note 17, at 205; see supra note 106 and accompanying text.
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The limited resources of many state disciplinary systems, therefore, may militate
against disciplinary counsel pushing for a lawyer apology when it would seem-
ingly derail a negotiated sanction. In making this calculus, disciplinary counsel
would need to weigh the importance and value to the complainant of an apology.
An apology may be very important to some complainants, while less important to
others.269 Similarly, disciplinary counsel should consider how resistant the lawyer
is to apologizing, particularly if pushing an apology seems likely to further
entrench or disaffect a reluctant lawyer.270 Counsel could also explore with reluc-
tant lawyer-respondents whether there might be some form of acknowledgement
that they might be willing to make, even if they are not willing to offer a robust
apology. In this way, the content of the apology itself could become negotiable.271
And this process of negotiating complainant needs and lawyer-respondent will-
ingness to apologize may prove educational to the lawyer.272
D. DISCIPLINARY HEARINGS
When disciplinary matters proceed to a hearing, lawyer-respondents typically
will not apologize during the fault stage due to concerns that an apology will be
viewed as an admission of wrongdoing.273 The challenge for lawyer-respondents,
however, is that there may not be a separate sanctions phase of the hearing after
misconduct has been found.274 As one former regulator noted, the lawyer is
“faced with the practical difficulty of arguing alternatively that the Commission
did not meet its burden of proving misconduct,” but if the lawyer is found to have
acted wrongfully, “the [lawyer] is remorseful.”275
It can also be very difficult for lawyer-respondents to apologize at this stage
for other reasons. Solo and small firm lawyers often view disciplinary authorities
and the discipline process with suspicion, and question their legitimacy and ob-
jectivity.276 And indeed, there may be some bias in the process.277 Moreover,
269. Cf. Allan et al., supra note 210.
270. See supra notes 219-20 and accompanying text.
271. See LAZARE, supra note 131, at 205; Verity Winship & Jennifer K. Robbennolt, Admissions of Guilt in
Civil Enforcement, 102 MINN. L. REV. 1077, 1133–34 (2018); see also Robbennolt, supra note 196.
272. See SMITH, supra note 150, at 78 (noting that “[o]ffenders might learn a great deal about the nature and
consequences of their wrongdoing” by negotiating the content of apology).
273. See Levy, supra note 56.
274. Donald Lundberg, I’m Sorry, So Sorry: The Element of Remorse in Professional Regulation, RES
GESTAE, Jan.-Feb. 2013, at 20. See ABA MODEL RULES FOR LAWYER DISCIPLINARY ENFORCEMENT R.
11 (D)(4) (2002); MONT. RULES FOR LAWYER DISCIPLINARY ENFORCEMENT 12 (D)(3)-(4) (2015) (including no
requirement for separating the culpability and sanctions phases of the disciplinary hearing).
275. See Lundberg, supra note 274, at 23.
276. ABEL, supra note 17, at 506; Levin, supra note 7, at 372–73; Mark Hansen, Picking on the Little Guy,
A.B.A. J., 30, 31 (Mar. 2003); OREGON STATE BAR DISCIPLINARY SYSTEM TASK FORCE REPORT (July 15,
2002), https://www.osbar.org/surveys_research/disciplinary.html [https://perma.cc/R3VZ-XV83].
277. Debra Cassens Weiss, New California Bar Study Finds Racial Disparities in Lawyer Discipline,
A.B.A. J. (2019), https://www.abajournal.com/news/article/california-bar-study-finds-racial-disparities-in-lawyer-
discipline [https://perma.cc/5RER-ZUBA]. But see REPORT BY THE STATE BAR OF CALIFORNIA, INVESTIGATION
AND PROSECUTION OF DISCIPLINARY COMPLAINTS AGAINST ATTORNEYS IN SOLO PRACTICE, SMALL SIZE LAW
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these lawyers often self-represent during discipline hearings and become deeply
entrenched in their positions.278 It can be very hard for them to pivot from
strongly advocating their innocence during the fault stage to exhibiting contrition
when sanctions are about to be imposed. This is especially true if the fault and
penalty evidence are heard on the same hearing date.279 Even when the guilt and
penalty phase are separated and lawyers are given the opportunity to express
remorse, it can be very difficult for some lawyers to do so.280
In addition, it might be argued that an apology at this late stage comes too late
to be meaningful.281 For some complainants and disciplinary authorities that may
be true. But, on the other hand, moral reflection often takes time and the
offender’s reflection on and understanding of the wrongdoing is often important
to victims.282 Thus, particularly if the delay in apologizing reflects an effort to
grapple with the wrong and the resulting harm,283 apologies at this stage may not
be too late to benefit the individuals who receive them or the respondent
lawyers.284
Lawyer apologies during disciplinary hearings might become more prevalent
if the ABA Standards for Imposing Lawyer Sanctions were amended to explicitly
provide that the mitigating factor of “remorse” can be demonstrated by a sincere
Firms and Large Size Law Firms (2001), http://www.calbar.ca.gov/Portals/0/documents/reports/2001_SB143-
Report.pdf?ver=2017-05-19-134106-347 [https://perma.cc/FA3F-PBJA]; Hansen, supra note 276, at 32–33
(describing results of NewMexico report finding no evidence of discrimination).
278. See, e.g., ABEL, supra note 17, at 508. In Wisconsin, for example, fewer than one-quarter of all lawyers
who received sanctions during 2013-2016 were represented by counsel. See LEVIN & FORTNEY, supra note 59,
at 25.
279. See ABEL, supra note 17, at 507 (noting that the structure of the disciplinary process is “profoundly
unconducive to repentance”).
280. See, e.g., id. at 359. In the Byler case study described earlier, Abel notes that Byler was asked in the
penalty stage “Are you sorry you didn’t put this money in escrow” but all the lawyer would comment was,
“With the benefit of hindsight, one might have taken a different course of action” and “I’m sorry that the thing
happened.” Id.
281. See, e.g., Moore & Mello, supra note 152 (finding that injured patients devalued apologies that came
significantly after the event). Reflecting the instinct that apologies should be offered soon after the offense, for-
mer Senator Fred Thompson reportedly said, “If you’ve got to eat any crow, or maybe even half a crow, it’s bet-
ter to do it warm than when it gets cold.” LAZARE, supra note 131, at 171. Similarly, Tavuchis notes that “there
is a critical, if variable, period following a transgression after which the potential efficacy of an apology dimin-
ishes or is nullified.” TAVUCHIS, supra note 21, at 87.
282. Frantz & Bennigson, supra note 162, at 204–205; see also SMITH, supra note 150, at 173 (discussing
the time and effort needed for categorical apology).
283. See, e.g., Wenzel et al., supra note 162.
284. For an example of one widely reported medical malpractice case that was contentious until the hospital
CEO apologized on the eve of trial, see John Hill, Kent Hospital Settles Suit with Woods Family, PROVIDENCE
J. (Dec. 2, 2009), http://www.projo.com/health/content/woods_trial_new_2_12-02-09_KVGLE5A_v12.
3cf5131.html [https://perma.cc/MF4H-RL9J] (“It was all I ever needed to see in my life, one human being
saying to another human being ‘I’m sorry for your loss.’”); Russell J. Moore & John Howell, “I’m Sorry”
Paves Way to Woods’ Suit Settlement, WARWICK BEACON (Dec. 3, 2009); see also LAZARE, supra note 131
(describing an instance in which the lateness of an apology, in conjunction with other deficits, contributed
to an unsuccessful apology, as well as apologies that were successful despite significant delay).
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apology made directly to those who the lawyer harmed.285 Evaluation of the
strength of remorse as a mitigating factor should include consideration of whether
the apology was accompanied by lawyer efforts to remedy the wrong. A written
apology after a finding of misconduct and before the sanctions phase, where pos-
sible, would enable discipline decisionmakers to evaluate the extent to which the
lawyer took responsibility for the wrongdoing.
Yet there is some risk that the apology will be drafted by the respondent’s
attorney—if the lawyer-respondent is represented—or will otherwise not genu-
inely reflect the respondent’s remorse.286 While such an apology may benefit the
complainant,287 its ability to contribute to the rehabilitation of the respondent law-
yer is less certain,288 as is its usefulness to the court when attempting to evaluate
the lawyer’s remorse. Oral lawyer apologies could also be evaluated by discipli-
nary authorities during the penalty phase, but evaluations of their sincerity would
be as challenging as they are for courts.289 Moreover, those apologies are only
likely to be meaningful to complainants if they are present at the hearings when
the apologies occur or are able to review a transcript of the hearing.
E. FORCED APOLOGY SANCTIONS
Courts occasionally force parties to apologize in criminal290 or civil cases291 or
as part of a disciplinary sanction.292 Other courts have declined to do so on the
285. The same could be achieved if courts would expressly recognize the importance of apologies when
considering remorse, but an amendment to the ABA Standards for Imposing Lawyer Sanctions is likely to gen-
erate swifter adoption of this approach.
286. The participation of the respondent’s lawyer does not necessarily have to undermine the utility of the
apology, whether it is delivered in writing or in person. In fact, in the criminal context, judges have suggested
that defendants are often unprepared for allocution and that attorneys could better prepare them to convey
remorse and accept responsibility. Bennett & Robbins, supra note 180, at 750, 755, 767.
287. Robbennolt, supra note 196, at 131 (finding that recipients discounted apologies offered through a law-
yer but finding that such apologies were better than no apology).
288. Much may depend on how the process of counseling the respondent concerning the apology occurs.
Indeed, respondents might benefit from being counseled through a process of introspection and reckoning so
that they can give a sincere apology. See generally Cohen, supra note 100; Jonathan Cohen, The Immorality of
Denial, 79 TUL. L. REV. 903 (2005). Good counselors may be able to help lawyers manage the threats to their
identity that stem from the complaint by reflecting on their core values. Such reflection can result in less defen-
siveness and more comprehensive apologies. See Schumann, supra note 132.
289. See supra notes 192–93 and accompanying text.
290. See, e.g., Melvin v. Zappala, No. 15-1225, 2016 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 47826, at *2 (W.D. Pa. Apr. 7,
2016) (describing order that former judge write letters of apology as part of sentence); Slayton v. State, No.
49A04-1410-CR-463, 2015 Ind. App. Unpub. LEXIS *458 (Ind. App. Apr. 22, 2015) (noting that lower court
ordered criminal defendant to write apology letter); State v. Whitfield, 827 So. 2d 1196, 1197 (La. Ct. App.
2002) (upholding sentence that included letter of apology to victim); State v. Lobato, 611 N.W.2d 101, 102
(Neb. 2000) (affirming sentence that included letter of apology to victims); State v. Ogden, No. 94-1485-CR,
1995 Wisc. App. LEXIS 85, at *2 (Wis. Ct. App. Jan. 26, 1995) (describing apology order); Xuan-Thao
Nguyen, Apologies as Intellectual Property Remedies: Lessons from China, 44 CONN. L. REV. 883, 890 (2012);
White, supra note 194, at 1268–69; Amanda Garrett, Apologize or Go To Jail, Judge Orders Criminals to Say,
“I’m Sorry,” to Victims, PLAIN DEALER, Oct. 9, 1999, at 1B.
291. See, e.g., Desjardins v. Van Buren Community Hosp., 969 F.2d 1280, 1283 (1st Cir. 1992); Imperial
Diner v. State Human Rights Appeals Bd., 417 N.E.2d 525, 528 (N.Y. 1980).
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basis that it is not the court’s role to order apologies293 or because the court lacked
the statutory294 or equitable power to do so.295 Even when courts conclude they
have the power to order apologies, however, forced apologies raise significant
constitutional concerns not present in the earlier scenarios when lawyers consent
to apologies.
Only a few courts have noted the likely First Amendment implications of
court-ordered apologies.296 Yet court-ordered apologies would seem to constitute
292. See, e.g., People v. Piccone, 459 P.3d 136, 163 (Colo. 2020); In re Kraushaar, 907 P.2d 836, 838 (Kan.
1995); In re Castellano, 566 P.2d 1152 (N.M. 1977). Courts sometimes require apologies as part of contempt
proceedings. See In re Kemper, No. 93CA15, 1994 Ohio App. LEXIS 619 at *10 (Ohio Ct. App. Jan. 31,
1994). Federal courts have also imposed apologies as sanctions or discipline for violations of their rules. See
Krim v. Banctexas Group., 99 F.3d 775, 776 (5th Cir. 1996); In re Swan, 833 F. Supp. 794, 800 (C.D. Cal.
1993), rev’d on other grounds sub nom. U.S. v. Wunsch, 84 F.3d 1110 (9th Cir. 1996); In re Gooch, 250 B.R.
887, 900 (Bankr. S.D. Ohio 2000). Likewise, in Australia and New Zealand, apology orders are used in cases of
unsatisfactory service. Bartlett, supra note 31, at 180–81, 186, 192. In England and Wales, the Office of Legal
Complaints, which deals with complaints against lawyers that do not rise to the level of a disciplinary charge,
can direct the lawyer to make an apology to the complainant if an informal resolution is not reached. Id. at 187–
88.
293. See Woodruff v. Ohman, 29 Fed. Appx. 337, 346 (6th Cir. 2002); McKee v. Turner, 491 F. 2d 1106,
1107 (9th Cir. 1974); Thompson v. Sholar, No. 5:19-CV-P197-TBR, 2020 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 51684 (W.D. Ky.
Mar. 25, 2020) (noting that court “was not commissioned to run around getting apologies”).
294. See, e.g., Birnbaum v. U.S., 588 F.2d 319, 321, 335 (2d Cir. 1978) (an apology requested for the gov-
ernment opening mail was not available under 28 U.S.C. § 1346 (b)); Top of Form Gray v. UAW Local 12 Jeep
Comm., No. 3:02CV7618, 2004 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 5877, at *7 (N.D. Ohio Mar. 16, 2004) (apology requested
from a union for discrimination was not available under ADA); City of Minneapolis v. Richardson, 239
N.W.2d 197, 205–06 (Minn. 1976) (apology requested because of discriminatory practices by police was not
available under Minnesota statute); Pa. Human Relations Comm’n v. Alto-Reste Park Cemetery Ass’n, 306
A.2d 881, 889 (Pa. 1973) (apology requested because of race-based discrimination was not available under
Pennsylvania Human Relations Act); Illinois v. Johnson, 528 N.E.2d 1360, 1361–62 (Ill. App. Ct. 1988)
(declining to uphold portion of sentence requiring a published apology in a newspaper where effect appeared to
go beyond intent of the statute).
295. Compare Villescas v. Abraham, 285 F. Supp. 2d 1248, 1256 (D. Colo. 2003) (apology is a permissible
equitable remedy) with Kitchen v. Essex Cty. Corr. Facility, No. 12-2199, 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 77356, at
*10 (D. N.J. May 31, 2012) (apology is not cognizable remedy “either within the meaning of a § 1983 action or
as a general legal remedy”); Burkes v. Tranquilli, No. 08-474, 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 51403, at *14 (W.D. Pa.
July 2, 2008) (finding no authority to require apology as a remedy); Woodruff v. Ohman, 29 Fed. Appx. at 346
(“[T]he district court exceeded its equitable power when it ordered [defendant] to apologize.”). See also
Rumbles v. Hill, 182 F.3d 1064, 1066–67 (9th Cir. 1999), overruled on other grounds, Booth v. Churner, 532
U.S. 731 (2001) (district court correctly “held that it had no power to . . . compel a party to apologize”).
296. SeeWoodruff v. Ohman, 29 Fed. Appx. at 346 (noting absence of authority “that would permit a court
to order a defendant to speak in a manner that may well contravene the beliefs the defendant holds”); Defend
Affirmative Action Party v. Regents of Univ. of Cal., No. 16-cv-01575-VC, 2016 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 60085, at
*2 (N.D. Cal. May 4, 2016) (noting that court-ordered apology would “almost certainly be a First Amendment
violation”); Dahn v. Adoption All., 164 F. Supp. 3d 1294, 1318 (D. Colo. 2016) (stating that “Court is cogni-
zant of the constitutional implications attendant to enjoining a party to make statements that may run contrary
to his or her beliefs”); Griffith v. Clark, No. LT-460-2, 1993 Va. Cir. LEXIS 41, at *37 (Va. Cir. Ct. Mar. 4,
1993) (stating that “First Amendment concerns preclude the court from ordering the apology originally sug-
gested by [defendant]”). The handful of courts that have actually analyzed the issue have been divided on the
constitutionality of forced apologies. Compare United States v. Clark, 918 F.2d 843, 847–48 (9th Cir. 1990),
overruled on other grounds, United States v. Keys, 95 F.3d 874 (9th Cir. 1998) (upholding apology requirement
in criminal case); State v. K.H.-H., 353 P.3d 661, 665 (Wash. 2015) (upholding apology requirement in juvenile
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compelled speech because they involve a state actor requiring an individual to
speak words and communicate ideas with which the speaker may fundamentally
disagree.297 Under a strict scrutiny standard, the state must show that the apology
order serves “a compelling interest and is narrowly tailored to achieve that inter-
est.”298 The “narrowly tailored” analysis asks whether the “least restrictive
means” have been used to achieve the state’s interest.
Court-ordered apologies may have difficulty meeting that standard. The purpose
of lawyer discipline is to protect the public, the administration of justice, and pub-
lic confidence in the bar.299 To date, states have not displayed much interest—
much less a “compelling interest”—in providing remedies for complainants via
the discipline system. Even if there were a compelling state interest in providing
complainants with a meaningful remedy, forced apologies are unlikely to be the
least restrictive means to achieve it. There are other remedies that could compen-
sate the complainant for the harm the lawyer caused—including fee restitution and
monetary damages—that would not raise First Amendment concerns.
If courts are able to order lawyer apologies as a sanction, they would most
likely order written apologies, with all the benefits and limitations of written apol-
ogies previously described.300 As noted, even when apologies are compelled,
they can benefit complainants because they provide acknowledgement that the
individual was wronged and help restore the complainant’s trust in the legal sys-
tem. Reports of apology sanctions may also reinforce for the legal profession the
matter) with Kelly Sutherlin McLeod Architecture v. Schneickert, 125 Cal. Rptr. 3d 83, 94–95 (Cal. App.
2011) (finding forced apology in civil arbitration proceeding violates party’s First Amendment rights).
297. As the Supreme Court has noted, the First Amendment protects “the decision of both what to say and
what not to say.” See Riley v. Nat’l Fed’n of the Blind of N.C., 487 U.S. 781, 796–97 (1988) (emphasis in origi-
nal). See also State v. K.H.-H, 374 P.3d 1141,1142–43 (Wash. 2016) (noting that “[b]ecause a forced apology
involves making an offender say something he does not wish to say, it implicates the compelled speech
doctrine”).
298. See Citizens United v. Fed. Election Comm’n, 558 U.S. 310, 340 (2010) (quoting Fed. Election
Comm’n v. Wisconsin Right to Life, Inc., 551 U.S. 449, 464 (2007)). But see K.H.-H, 353 P.3d at 667–69
(Bjorgen, J., dissenting) (noting that majority applied the wrong test in its analysis of the constitutionality of a
court-ordered apology). Alternatively, the Court might conclude that an apology order would need to withstand
the somewhat less rigorous “exacting scrutiny” standard, which the Court has suggested might be appropriate
in cases where forced payments of agency fees were at issue. See Janus v. AFSCME, 138 S. Ct. 2448, 2464
(2018). Exacting scrutiny requires that the compelled speech must “serve a compelling state interest that cannot
be achieved through means significantly less restrictive of associational freedoms.” See id. at 2464–2465 (quot-
ing Knox v. SEIU, 567 U.S. 298 (2012)). The Court has not clearly indicated when it will apply the exacting
scrutiny standard, but court-ordered apologies are also unlikely to withstand that demanding test.
299. See, e.g., In reMarshall, 762 A.2d 530, 540 (D.C. Ct. App. 2000); In re Kurth, 433 P.3d 679, 692 (Kan.
2019); In re Grigsby, 815 N.W.2d 836, 844 (Minn. 2012); In re Chastain, 532 S.E.2d 264, 268 (S.C. 2000); In
re Juarez, 24 P.3d 1040, 1063 (Wash. 2001); ABA STANDARDS FOR IMPOSING LAWYER SANCTIONS, Standard
1.1 (1992).
300. See supra notes 254–55 and accompanying text. Written apologies provide documentation that the
apology occurred and that it was sufficient to satisfy the court’s requirements. They mostly arise in connection
with private admonitions, public reprimands or probation. Apologies are not typically required when lawyers
are suspended or disbarred but are instead required as conditions of reinstatement. See infra note 302 and
accompanying text.
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idea that clients and the public should be treated with dignity and respect, and
that they are entitled to apologies when lawyers cause them harm.
A required apology may also force the lawyer to articulate and possibly reflect
upon the reasons why his behavior was problematic and the harm that it caused.
Yet courts must be mindful that some lawyers will not reflect and that some may
even experience forced apologies as a degradation ritual that has the effect of ali-
enating the lawyer and making him view the discipline process and its goals with
distrust or contempt.301 In some cases, a significant risk of alienation might coun-
sel for communication of disapproval of the lawyer’s conduct—to the attorney,
the complainant, and the public—through means other than an apology. In such
cases, the sanction itself or a statement by the disciplinary authority or court
reflecting empathy for the victim might have to substitute for an apology. In other
cases, where the complainant is particularly in need of acknowledgment and can
obtain no other relief, a court may want to consider ordering an apology even if
the lawyer is apt to respond negatively.
F. REINSTATEMENT
When a lawyer is disbarred or suspended from practice, courts occasionally
order the lawyer to apologize as a condition of reinstatement.302 This approach
seems to present fewer First Amendment concerns about compelled speech
because the lawyer can choose whether to reapply to practice. The courts that
have required an apology as a condition of reinstatement mostly have not consid-
ered the constitutional question, which may be because disciplined lawyers have
felt ill-positioned to raise it.303
It seems likely that courts will conclude that they can require lawyers to apolo-
gize as a condition of reinstatement without violating lawyers’ constitutional
rights,304 but they have not yet carefully considered the issue. The closest the U.S.
301. See supra notes 219 and accompanying text. It is possible that being forced to write an apology might
be less humiliating or alienating than being forced to apologize face-to-face. Future research should more thor-
oughly explore the effects of written and face-to-face apologies on both the recipient and the apologizer.
302. See supra note 84 and accompanying text; see also In re Moncier, 550 F. Supp. 768, 813 (E.D. Tenn.
2008); In re Mekler, 669 A.2d 655, 671 (Del. 1995); In re Black, 941 P.2d 1380, 1387 (Kan. 1997); Jonathan
Ringel, Six Georgia Lawyers Lose Bar Licenses, DAILY REPORT (Fulton County, Ga.), Apr. 28, 2005, at 9.
303. See Ilhyung Lee, The Law and Culture of the Apology in Korean Dispute Settlement (with Japan and
the United States in Mind), 27 MICH. J. INT’L L. 1, 44 (2005).
304. Some judges have echoed the view, first voiced by Benjamin Cardozo, that “membership in the bar is a
privilege burdened with conditions.” In re Rouss, 116 N.E. 782, 783 (N.Y. 1917). Under this view, which has
been dubbed the constitutional conditions theory, attorneys voluntarily relinquish their First Amendment rights
when they become members of a state’s bar. See Margaret Tarkington, Throwing Out the Baby, The ABA’s
Subversion of Lawyer First Amendment Rights, 24 TEX. REV. L. & POL. 41, 47 (2019). This theory has been
criticized by most scholars. Id. at 48–49. Nevertheless, the constitutional conditions theory has shown remark-
able endurance. See, e.g., Ippolito v. Fla., 824 F. Supp. 1562, 1573 (M.D. Fla. 1993); Cambiano v. Neal, 35 S.
W. 3d 792, 799 (Ark. 2000); Stuart v. Walker, 143 A.3d 761, 767 (D.C. Ct. App. 2016); Brooks v. Bd. of Prof’l
Responsibility, 578 S.W.3d 421, 427 (Tenn. 2019); Lawyer Disciplinary Bd. v. Sidiropolis, 828 S.E.2d 839,
856 (W.Va. 2019) (Workman, J., concurring); Office of Lawyer Regulation v. Mandelman, 912 N.W.2d 395,
402 (Wis. 2018).
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Supreme Court has come to addressing the First Amendment implications of a
condition requiring a lawyer to apologize was in In re Snyder, when it considered
a lower court’s offer to dissolve a suspension order against a lawyer if he apolo-
gized for writing a letter the court considered disrespectful.305 But the Court did
not ultimately decide the constitutional issue.306 Since then, some courts have
required lawyers to apologize to avoid contempt sanctions,307 but they have not
considered the constitutionality of those requirements. In one recent case, a fed-
eral district court rejected a lawyer’s argument that an apology required as a con-
dition of early reinstatement violated his First Amendment rights, but the court’s
reasoning was undeveloped.308
Short of requiring an apology, courts and discipline authorities might incentiv-
ize lawyers seeking reinstatement to practice to consider making an apology to
victims by stressing the usefulness of apologies in demonstrating remorse and
rehabilitation when lawyers apply for reinstatement. One way to encourage these
apologies would be to expressly incorporate into the ABA Model Rules for
Lawyer Disciplinary Enforcement commentary a statement that apologies are
among the criteria that should be considered when evaluating whether the lawyer
“recognizes the wrongfulness and seriousness of the misconduct for which the
lawyer was suspended or disbarred.”309 While this could generate some insincere
apologies, those apologies are also likely to provide victims and disciplinary
authorities with many of the advantages previously described.310 By encouraging
apologies through the Standards rather than imposing coercive conditions, this
might also make the process of apologizing more meaningful to the sanctioned
lawyers.
305. In re Snyder, 472 U.S. 634 (1985). In that case, the lower court offered to dissolve a six-month order of
suspension against Snyder if he apologized for what the court perceived to be a disrespectful letter. Snyder
declined to apologize. Id. at 638–41.
306. The Court did not find the letter supported a finding of contumacious behavior and never reached the
constitutional issue. Id. at 647.
307. See, e.g., In re Smith, 926 So. 2d 878, 889 (Miss. 2006) (suggesting that lawyer may avoid further jail
time for criminal contempt if lawyer apologized); In re Daniels, 530 A.2d 1260, 1267 (N.J. 1987) (noting that
judge offered to vacate jail sentence for contempt and reduce fine if lawyer apologized); Comm. on Legal
Ethics of W. Va. State Bar v. Farber, 408 S.E.2d 274, 282-83 (W.Va. 1991) (noting that judge offered to drop
criminal contempt matter if lawyer apologized); see also In re Smothers, 322 F.3d 438, 443 (6th Cir. 2002)
(stating that lawyers can be required to apologize on the record in order to avoid a criminal contempt
proceeding).
308. See In re Schuchardt, No. 3:18-MC-39, 2019 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 212603 (E.D. Tenn. Dec. 10, 2019). In
that case, the magistrate judge had recommended that an apology by Schuchardt, who was suspended from
practice, be included in any application for early reinstatement. Id. at *33–34. The district court found that
because Schuchardt was “not being compelled to apologize in any way and is free to serve his suspension with-
out apology” the First Amendment claim was “meritless” Id. at *34. The court ultimately adopted the magis-
trate’s recommendation, stating that Schuchardt may apply for early reinstatement, but the application “must”
include a copy of a letter of apology to another judge. Id. at *54. Using this same reasoning, a court could con-
clude that an apology could be made a condition of reinstatement because the lawyer was free not to reapply
for readmission.
309. ABAMODEL RULES FOR LAWYER DISCIPLINARY ENFORCEMENT R. 25(E)(4) (2002).
310. See supra notes 18–22, 140–44 and accompanying text.
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Lawyers seek reinstatement to practice following suspensions and disbar-
ments, which are usually only imposed when serious misconduct or substantial
harm has occurred.311 Victims tend to experience a stronger desire for apologies
after more severe or intentional harm,312 though more severe harm or more inten-
tional conduct make it harder for apologies to do their repair work.313 In addition,
the fact that these apologies may not come for years after the lawyer misconduct
may temper their effects and some complainants may not value them.314 But for
some complainants, an apology may be better late than never.315 When that is the
case, apologies at this stage, as at other stages of the discipline process, can pro-
vide the victim with the feeling that the respondent lawyer acknowledges the
harm the lawyer caused. By responding to victims’ need for apologies, authorities
can also help affirm that the legal system and the profession more broadly respect
the victims.
One advantage of apologies in the context of reinstatement is that the lawyer
has time and distance from the discipline proceeding, which may enable the law-
yer to reflect on what occurred and become more psychologically prepared to
make a genuine apology. An apology at this point might also be experienced as
part of a reintegration process. The notion of “earned redemption” contemplates
that wrongdoers should be held accountable and that they should be able to “earn
their way back into the trust of the community.”316 An apology allows the lawyer
to profess understanding of and commitment to the relevant professional norms,
signaling the promise of improved behavior going forward. This expressed under-
standing also makes it more likely that colleagues and peers will reintegrate the
lawyer as part of the community of lawyers.317
CONCLUSION
Lawyers are paid to be knowledge experts and it can be hard for them to admit
mistakes—even to themselves. Not all lawyers will be willing to apologize. And
not all lawyer apologies will be successful or satisfying to complainants or disci-
plinary authorities. Badly executed apologies may be counterproductive or com-
pound the original harm. But those lawyers who are willing to engage in the
introspection necessary for a meaningful apology may find that they are able to
311. See, e.g., ABA STANDARDS FOR IMPOSING LAWYER SANCTIONS II (1992).
312. See, e.g., Leunissen et al., supra note 132, at 316–21; Folmer et al., supra note 132.
313. See, e.g., Bennett & Earwaker, supra note 20, at 460; Ohbuchi et al., supra note 20; C. Ward Struthers,
Judy Eaton, Alexander G. Santelli, Melissa Uchiyama & Nicole Shirvani, The Effects of Attributions of Intent
and Apology on Forgiveness: When Saying Sorry May Not Help the Story, 44 J. EXPERIMENTAL SOC. PSYCHOL.
983, 986 (2008).
314. SeeMoore &Mello, supra note 152.
315. See supra note 280 and accompanying text.
316. Gordon Bazemore, Restorative Justice and Earned Redemption: Communities, Victims, and Offender
Reintegration, 41 AM. BEHAV. SCI. 768, 770 (1998).
317. See, e.g., Dena M. Gromet & Tyler G. Okimoto, Back Into the Fold: The Influence of Offender Amends
and Victim Forgiveness on Peer Reintegration, 24 BUS. ETHICS Q. 411, 419, 422 (2014).
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repair relationships, regain trust, learn from their mistakes, improve their stand-
ing, and obtain better outcomes. Their experience of the discipline process may
also be less adversarial and prolonged. Even those attorneys who offer grudging
apologies may be able to reap at least some of these benefits. Disciplinary author-
ities who effectively encourage apologies may find that they are better able to
educate and reintegrate lawyers, more effectively affirm important professional
norms, and improve public trust in the profession. Importantly, all of this can
make the discipline system more meaningful and satisfying for complainants.
Law schools have tried in recent years to teach law students how to identify
their mistakes and reflect upon how they can do better in the future.318 But law
schools have not traditionally taught students how to admit those mistakes to
others, even though lawyers are increasingly being required to do so. An ABA for-
mal ethics opinion now states that lawyers are required to disclose to their clients
when they make a material error that is reasonably likely to harm or prejudice the
client.319 In such instances, an apology may help avert a lawsuit or resolve the mat-
ter on more favorable terms for the lawyer. Admitting mistakes and apologizing
for themmay also prevent further mistakes or help keep the lawyer-client relation-
ship from deteriorating to the point that a disciplinary complaint is necessary.
Lawyers, therefore, need to learn how to admit mistakes, understand the benefits
of apologies, and become skilled at providing good apologies.
There is a human tendency to share successes, but not mistakes or failures.320 As
we have seen, mistakes and failures can threaten self-esteem. But we also tend to
underestimate the valuable information that stories about failure can impart.321 One
way to help law students and lawyers develop a healthier approach to mistakes is for
professors and mentors to share their own mistakes with their students and mentees.322
318. See, e.g., Jodi S. Balsam, Susan L. Brooks & Margaret Reuter, Assessing Law Students as Reflective
Practitioners, 62 N.Y. L. SCH. L. REV. 49, 52 (2018); Don Peters, Mapping, Modeling, and Critiquing:
Facilitating Learning Negotiation, Mediation, Interviewing, and Counseling, 48 FLA. L. REV. 875, 878, 889–
90 (1996); Nina W. Tarr, The Skill of Evaluation as an Explicit Goal of Clinical Training, 21 PAC. L.J. 967,
968–73 (1989); see also Jay Feinman & Marc Feldman, Pedagogy and Politics, 73 GEO. L.J. 875, 891 (1985)
(calling for law schools to teach “critical self-reflectiveness”).
319. ABA Comm. on Prof’l Ethics & Grievances, Formal Op. 481 (2018). Lawyers must also disclose their
errors if they are of such a nature that “it would reasonably cause a client to consider terminating the representa-
tion even in the absence of harm or prejudice.”
320. See, e.g., Lauren Eskreis-Winkler & Ayelet Fishbach, Hidden Failures, 157 ORG. BEHAV. & HUM.
DECISION PROCESSES 57, 60–62 (2020).
321. Id. at 63–65.
322. See generally Stephanie D. Easton & Julie Oseid, “And Bad Mistakes? I’ve Made a Few”: Sharing
Mistakes to Mentor New Lawyers, 77 ALB. L. REV. 499 (2013). Note, too, the trend of holding events to reflect
on professional screw-ups. See FUCKUP NIGHTS, https://fuckupnights.com/ [https://perma.cc/7LGZ-W4FG]
(last visited June 15, 2021).
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Such sharing permits vicarious learning from others’ mistakes.323 Openness about
mistakes, moreover, can help to normalize the fact that lawyers, even good ones,
make mistakes, and make it easier for others to admit error.324 Such openness can
also help to foster a growth-mindset approach to mistakes, treating mistakes as
opportunities for learning and improvement, rather than as evidence that the attor-
ney is not cut out for the practice of law.325
Discussion of the role of apologies across practice settings could be introduced
in law school courses on professional responsibility or client counseling, or incor-
porated into clinical work.326 These discussions could include teaching students
about the barriers to admitting responsibility,327 the nature of successful apolo-
gies, and the range of positive benefits that apologies can have. Simulations and
role-play exercises can help students practice the communications skills neces-
sary to apologize well.328 Programs designed to teach medical professionals to
apologize often successfully incorporate exercises in which participants can prac-
tice apologizing to standardized patients, improving participants’ competence
and confidence in offering apologies.329 These skills are not only important for
lawyers in the disciplinary context, but will have great benefits for successfully
navigating lawyer-client relations throughout the lawyer’s career.
323. Albert Bandura, Vicarious Processes: A Case of No-Trial Learning, 2 ADVANCES EXPERIMENTAL SOC.
PSYCHOL. 1 (1965).
324. See Easton & Oseid, supra note 322; Taft, supra note 128, at 360.
325. See CAROL DWECK, MINDSET: THE NEW PSYCHOLOGY OF SUCCESS (2008); see also Easton & Oseid,
supra note 322, at 509 (“Mistakes then, are not something to be avoided at all costs, but something to embrace
when they happen despite our best human efforts to avoid them. They are career-boosters, not career-killers.”).
On the importance of institutional culture in shaping how lawyers deal with mistakes, see O’Grady, supra note
19, at 36–43; Robbennolt & Sternlight, supra note 106, at 1173–74.
326. Some medical schools have begun to incorporate training about error disclosure and apologies into
their curricula. See, e.g., Ralph A. Gillies, Stacie H. Speers, Sara E. Young & Christopher A. Fly, Teaching
Medical Error Apologies: Development of a Multi-Component Intervention, 43 FAM. MED. 400 (2011); Anne J.
Gunderson, Kelly M. Smith, David B. Mayer, Timothy McDonald & Nikki Centomani, Teaching Medical
Students the Art of Medical Error Full Disclosure: Evaluation of a New Curriculum, 21 TEACHING &
LEARNING IN MED. 229 (2009); Joseph L. Halbach & Laurie L. Sullivan, Teaching Medical Students About
Medical Errors and Patient Safety: Evaluation of a Required Curriculum, 80 ACAD. MED. 600 (2005); Chan
Woong Kim, Sun Jung Myung, Eun Kyung Eo & Yerim Chang, Improving Disclosure of Medical Error
Through Educational Program as a First Step Toward Patient Safety, 17 BMC MED. EDUC. 52 (2017);
Katherine Mangan, Acting Sick, 53 CHRON. HIGHER EDUC. A10 (2006).
327. See, e.g., CATHERINE G. O’GRADY & TIGRAN ELDRED, BEYOND THE RULES: A BEHAVIORAL LEGAL
ETHICS APPROACH TO UNDERSTANDING WHY LAWYERS MAKE UNETHICAL DECISIONS AND WHAT CAN BE
DONE ABOUT IT (forthcoming 2021).
328. See generally ROY STUCKEY, BEST PRACTICES FOR LEGAL EDUCATION: A VISION AND A ROAD MAP
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